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ABSTRACT
TRANSFER AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF PRACTICE
Kenneth A. Smith
December 5, 2014
This dissertation engages in a close reading of the research in composition on
transfer, a concept that refers to how the practices learned in one situation influence what
a person can do in a future situation. In the studies that have appeared over the last two
decades, the results have indicated that not much transfers between writing courses and
future contexts, whether they be disciplinary courses or professional workplaces. Yet,
despite the increasing prominence of transfer research, little time has been spent
discussing the uses and limitations of the concept. To better understand its growing
popularity among researchers, I examine its roots in genre theory, its use by empirical
researchers, and its function in the debate over first-year composition. Part of the reason
we have trouble isolating instances of “transfer” is because of the way the concept frames
our understanding of writing development. It treats practices almost like commodities,
mental tools that are acquired in the classroom and then eventually carried by learners
into new situations.
Following the work of social theorists like Stephen Turner, Jean Lave, and Pierre
Bourdieu, I argue for a model of practice that views it as a temporal “coupling” between
a person’s habitual dispositions and their social environment. The main contribution this
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perspective makes to transfer theory is the emphasis it places on time. Because the world
is always in flux, students must continually respond to new challenges, whether they are
as simple as adjusting to a difficult professor’s expectations or as complex as writing in
an unfamiliar genre. If we look at writing development from this perspective, transfer is
ubiquitous, for learners must necessarily draw on their previous experiences to meet the
demands of a changing world.
The first chapter establishes the dissertation’s theoretical framework, focusing
especially on Bourdieu’s discussion of practice and criticisms made of his work. The
second chapter looks critically at the metaphors employed to understand writing practices
in genre theory and transfer studies. The metaphors point to some unspoken assumptions
in our discipline, mainly by demonstrating the ways researchers portray practices almost
like commodities. The third chapter examines the methodological approaches used to
examine transfer and shows how researchers often don’t fully take into account the tacit
dimension of practice. The fourth chapter articulates an alternative model of writing
practices, one that brings together the work of practice theory and actor-oriented transfer
research. In the final chapter, I suggest some directions for future research, arguing we
especially need more information about how students deal with unexpected situations.
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CHAPTER I
THE TRANSFER PROBLEM
Over the past decade, a consensus has emerged among many composition
scholars that the college writing curriculum is in desperate need of reform. While they are
not always in agreement about what needs to be changed, most agree that something
needs to be done, particularly in relationship to the first-year composition course. David
Smit has argued for the development of a vertical writing curriculum, where advanced
composition courses are taught by writing specialists with expertise in a particular
discipline. In Reconceiving Writing, Rethinking Writing Instruction, Joseph Petraglia,
David Russell, and many others argue for the abolition of the first-year composition
sequence. Elizabeth Wardle and Douglas Down have claimed that we should transform
the first-year course into an introduction to the composition discipline, partially on the
premise that such a course would help students develop some metawareness about how
writing varies in different situational contexts. In a similar fashion, Anne Beaufort, Amy
Devitt, and Anis Bawarshi want the course to explicitly focus on metacognition, which
they claim would encourage the development of rhetorical flexibility. While these
proposals vary in their comprehensiveness, most would require a considerable overhaul
of the current educational system. To accommodate some of these suggested curricular
reforms, administrators would need to change hiring practices, institute new training
programs, and rethink disciplinary writing courses.
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As with any call for reform, these proposals are all rooted in a critique of contemporary
practices. For the remainder of the dissertation, I will refer to this shared critique as the
“transfer problem.” According to this family of arguments, the first-year composition
sequence was originally developed with the intention of helping students develop a set of
general writing practices. Then, when student entered their specific disciplinary courses,
they would build upon these foundations. For that reason, many courses focused on
grammar instruction, which was viewed as providing students with the invariable rules
that governed all writing tasks. The same logic also underpinned the process movement,
which argued that the main goal of writing courses should be teaching a process that can
be used to undertake any writing task. As Joseph Petraglia explains, this theoretical
framework imagined writing “as a masterable body of skills that can be formed and
practiced irrespective of the formal context of the writing classroom” (56). After the
“social turn” in composition studies, scholars began to raise questions about the existence
of such general skills, choosing instead to focus on the unique rhetorical techniques used
by different communities. Given how much writing varies between groups, scholars
became increasingly skeptical of our ability to teach a single set of skills that would
transfer to all situations.
Once we begin to doubt the existence of such “general” writing skills, the
mandatory first-year composition sequence becomes difficult to justify. If our goal is to
help students help prepare students for the writing they will do in future courses, our task
would seem almost impossible—even if we limit our scope to just academic genres, we
are still faced with a daunting amount of variation. It has become an open question
whether teaching certain “first-year composition” genres helps students write more
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effectively in future courses. To better understand this issue, many composition scholars
have turned to transfer studies, a field of educational psychology that Ference Marton
characterizes as focused on “how what is learned in one situation affects or influences
what the learner is capable of doing in another situation” (499). While educational
researchers have utilized numerous methods to examine such questions, many studies
involve experiments that present learners with a task, monitor the skills necessary to
complete it, and then examine whether they are utilized to solve a similar problem in a
different context (Marton 504). These studies have often produced dismal results—in
many cases, they determine that little transfer occurs between two situations, which
corroborates the idea that our skills are radically context-dependent. Summarizing the
history of transfer research, Douglas Detterman claims that studies exhibiting “true,
spontaneous transfer are rare if they exist at all” (15). As he explains, the most effective
strategy is probably to “teach people exactly what you want them to learn in a situation as
close as possible to the one in which the learning will be applied” (17).
While transfer research in composition studies remains in its infancy, our findings
have supported a similar conclusion. For the most part, our understanding is limited to
longitudinal case studies and other qualitative approaches, but they all indicate the
complex, turbulent nature of learning to write. Students don't just master a skill and then
apply it in future situations; rather, they embark on what Lee Ann Carroll describes as the
“literacy rollercoaster,” a process that involves periods of both success and failure (49).
The existing studies feature numerous examples of students struggling to understand new
tasks, and, in many cases, unsuccessfully drawing upon strategies developed in previous
courses (Beaufort; McCarthy; Walvoord and McCarthy). Indeed, the research contains
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few examples of successful transfer of writing skills, and these studies mostly involve
relatively small samples of students (Nowacek; Artemeva; Smart and Brown).
Composition scholars have proposed several different ways of addressing the
“transfer problem.” These curricular reforms can be divided into two broad categories.
Scholars in the first group argue for the abolition of the first-year composition sequence
in favor of disciplinary writing courses. They buttress this position with a number of
other claims. First, they argue that the continued existence of the first-year course
promotes certain mythologies about the nature of writing practices; so long as it exists,
faculty can continue to believe that writing is a transparent container for ideas, that it just
involves learning grammatical rules, and other such problematic assumptions. According
to Russell, this myth has benefited the English department by allowing it to serve as the
arbitrator of what constitutes “good style”; however, it also “makes it easier for a
discipline to assume that when students from previously excluded language backgrounds
fail to successfully write in its genres, it has nothing to do with its failure” (67). Once the
course has been abolished, other disciplines will have to take more responsibility for the
development of writing skills. Secondly, these scholars have argued the first-year course
encourages unjust labor practices. As Sharon Crowley points out, first-year composition
teachers “usually are paid less, have no access to benefits or job security, have little or no
advance warning about what and when they will teach, and have inadequate office and
communications facilities” (241). If the course was eliminated, administrators would
have no need for the adjunct faculty that fill these positions. Finally, such reforms would
liberate our discipline from its association with the course—while this might result in less
funding, it would also “free up” scholars to pursue other interests.
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In contrast, scholars in the second group argue the first-year course might still
serve a useful purpose. However, it should be given a more humble mission—instead of
attempting to teach students a set of universal skills, instructors should focus on
developing mindfulness, critical consciousness, or metacognition, a process by which an
individual makes a practice’s tacit principles more explicit so he/she can make a more
conscious choice between the possible options. Support for such a curriculum has come
from scholars working in a variety of fields (Beaufort; Canagarajah; Bawarshi; Takyoshi
and Selfe). Proponents of metacognition generally argue that it encourages two different
dispositions. First, it makes students “rhetorically flexible,” more capable of creatively
meshing discourses, languages, genres, and modalities to meet the demands of new
situations. While they might not immediately know how to respond to future writing
situations, students should be able to more quickly develop the necessary skills.
Secondly, such metacognitive ability makes students more consciously aware of the
political dimension of language. That way, students become aware of how certain
practices advance the ideological interests of dominant social institutions and therefore
will be more capable of resistance. Scholars in this group have recommended several
reforms, including promoting genre awareness, analyzing the uses of different modalities,
and creatively meshing different languages. The idea is that we should no longer focus on
helping students become more competent in a specific genre but should teach them how
to successfully adapt their skills to new contexts.
While these reforms differ in many respects, they both stem from the belief that
transfer is an intractable problem. As Smit puts it, “the evidence suggests that learners do
not necessarily transfer the kinds of knowledge and skills they have learned previously to
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new tasks. If such transfer occurs at all, it is largely unpredictable and depends on the
learners' background and experience, factors over which teachers have little control”
(117). Or, in the words of Russell, “writing does not exist apart from its uses, for it is a
tool for accomplishing object(ive)s beyond itself . . . from this theoretical perspective, the
object(ive) of [first-year writing courses] is extremely ambiguous because those involved
in it are teaching and learning the use of a tool (writing) for no particular activity system”
(“Activity Theory” 57). To provide one final example, Beaufort argues that first-students
are often “ill-prepared to examine, question, or understand the literacy standards of
discourse communities they are encountering in other disciplines . . . this can result in
negative transfer of learning: what worked for a freshman writing essay is inappropriately
applied to writing in history, or social sciences, or sciences or in business” (11). Because
first-year composition is not attached to a specific discipline, many researchers are
enormously skeptical that students can develop skills that will be useful in their future
disciplinary courses. My dissertation takes this shared belief in the “transfer problem” as
its point of departure. Rather than seeing transfer as a practical problem faced by
curriculum designers, I see it primarily as a theoretical problem that has arisen because of
how transfer causes us to view the learning process.
The Importance of Transfer Research
The most beneficial aspect of the contemporary transfer research is how it has
brought attention to how individual learners change as they move through the curriculum.
Partially because of the “social turn” in composition pedagogy over the last two decades,
a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to what genres of writing are done in
different institutional settings. One of the reasons that transfer has come to be viewed as

6

such a thorny problem is our increasing awareness of the tremendous variety of practices
that are classified as “writing” in the disciplines. In a series of studies done by Amy
Devitt on tax accountants, she reveals the ways that novice writers develop reports on
legal matters by fully reproducing large chunks of text from relevant tax codes. Jeanne
Fahnstock and Marie Secor have shown the way researchers employ special topoi, which
are specialized forms of argumentation unique to certain contexts. In their work on
literary studies, they have shown how scholars unconsciously draw on numerous
strategies, such as the idea that a deeper, more complex reality exists beneath the surface
of texts. In one particularly interesting study, Peter Medway examined what he describes
as the “fuzzy genre” of architecture students’ sketchbooks, which feature everything from
detailed illustrations to inspirational poems. The actual texts varied considerably in
almost all respects, including everything from their physical format to their actual
content. Some of the books were little more than sequences of drawings, while others
included almost no sketches and relied mostly on written text. They sometimes contained
business cards nestled in the pages and other documents collected over the years. As
Medway observes, part of the appeal of genre theory is the idea that genres act as
institutional “shortcuts” that individuals can deploy to navigate reoccurring social
situations. When faced with texts like architectural notebooks, the question arises of how
the genre can possibly serve as a “mental shortcut” due to the amount of variability in the
finished products.
“Fuzzy genres” are instances where transfer theory might clearly illuminate
aspects of writing that are missed by approaches that focus primarily on how texts are
used by social groups. As Medway observes, what is perhaps most interesting about the
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architectural notebooks is how students actually went about learning to produce them.
One set of students seemed to use “procedures [that] had been carried over into this
context from their experience of taking notes in notes in conventional academic lectures”
(134). Another student borrowed from “the DayTimer organizer that he had previously
kept and that had proved too small for the expanded range of inscriptional demands that
now had to meet” (134). One student even borrowed from practices learned from her
French high school education. In many ways, these notebooks vividly demonstrate how
students deploy skills that they learned in previous contexts creatively to tackle problems
in new settings. Transfer research brings with it a particular focus on the individual
student and how they change as they move throughout their lives. Rather than seeing the
texts they produce as solely the products of being socialized into a particular community,
transfer encourages us to see learning as the process of cobbling together what we’ve
learned to overcome new challenges. Each new social setting becomes simply one small
part of the story of how one learns to write—a process that began when the student spoke
his/her first word, that continued through elementary and high school, that happens
during conversations with friends, that occurs while reading political blogs and watching
television, that will proceed into future university courses and professional careers, and
that ultimately will have a scope that extends far beyond our classroom.
My dissertation sprung from the desire to retain transfer research’s focus on the
development of the individual learner while clearing the theoretical debris that makes the
writing classroom seem like such a fraught institution. Following in the tradition of
neopragmatist theorists such as Richard Rorty, my interest here is more in “dissolving
inherited problems rather than in solving them” (20). As he perceives it, the goal of the
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abstract theorizing that I see myself undertaking in this dissertation is not the discovery of
a secret hidden reality missed by researchers; rather, it’s an attempt to argue that we
should consider discarding our old tools and using new ones. As Rorty puts it, “to come
up with such a vocabulary is more like discarding the lever and the chock because one
has envisaged the pulley, or like discarding gesso and tempera because one has now
figured out how to size a canvas properly” (12). My claim is that the perennial failure of
researchers to detect “transfer” between disciplines is not the product of an intrinsic
limitation of the human mind but rather because of the vocabulary being employed by
researchers. I want to suggest that we won’t resolve the difficulties uncovered in recent
transfer studies by simply looking harder or gathering more data or performing more
longitudinal research. My suspicion is that what we are currently imagining as “transfer”
is happening all the time right underneath our noses, and how to see it is to look for it in a
different way.
I will confess that I find myself reaching for a new vocabulary partially for
political reasons. I’m not the first to be troubled by the conclusions that transfer research
seems to draw about the students that populate our classrooms. As Daniel L. Schwartz,
John D. Bransford, and David Sears argue in “Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer,” the
classic definitions and measures of transfer have the troubling effect of making learners
“look dumb.” Initial transfer studies placed learners in sequestered problem solving
environments that were designed to eliminate the “competing influences” of the skills
that they were provided in previous settings (5). Research subjects usually were tested on
their ability to solve abstract logic puzzles that had little relationship to the skills and
competencies that they have developed over a lifetime of education. Often, transfer
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studies ignored the sophistication of the practices actually employed by individuals in
their effort to trace the impact of a particular educational experience. Jean Lave
demonstrates this point quite vividly in Cognition in Practice, where she examines the
mathematical procedures used by supermarket shoppers to decide on the best purchase.
As she points out, little correlation existed between their ability to successfully navigate
the supermarket and their aptitude at solving traditional mathematical problems. She
concludes that “the success and frequency of calculation in supermarket and simulation
experiments bear no statistical relationship with schooling, years since schooling was
completed, or age” (57). While it might be tempting to conclude that their formal
mathematics training had little effect on their everyday experiences, they might be
drawing on their schooling in subtle ways that are more difficult to detect. Schwartz,
Bransford, and Sears have suggested that school-taught mathematics might enable people
to “invent or more quickly learn new techniques that were suited to a shopping context”
(5). When we imagine learning as little more than the direct application of a skill in
another context, we risk missing the ways learners innovate their practices to cope with
new challenges.
While composition scholars rarely takes the “experimental” approach popular in
educational research, the fact that we’ve arrived at some of the same conclusions should
at least give us pause. Linda Bergmann and Janet Zepernick paint a picture of student
learners that are ruthlessly seeking to improve their grades and hold obviously
problematic views about the English discipline. Lucille Parkinson McCarthy describes
the student in her study as a “stranger in strange lands” who “believed that the writing he
was doing was totally unlike anything he had done before” (126). Anne Beaufort
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characterizes one student as using arguments that were “poorly supported” and unable to
recognize that history professors want “focused, linear arguments” (104). My concern is
that these studies fail to recognize the insightfulness and creativity that seems evident to
those of us who work daily as instructors of college-level writing students. Perhaps more
importantly, they seem to neglect the abilities that seem evident in other studies, such as
the rich array of resources that Medway’s architectural students use in their sketchbooks.
Because my argument hinges on the fact that looking at the data in a different way might
cause readers to notice other aspects of the learning process, a considerable amount of the
dissertation will be spent revisiting these transfer studies and rethinking some of their
main conclusions.
Social Theory and Transfer Studies
I see my work fitting into a tradition of social theory that can ultimately be traced
back to Pierre Bourdieu. While he devoted his attention to a variety of subjects, he
consistently maintained that his work was an attempt to move beyond the traditional
divisions that plagued social science, particularly the distinction between what he calls
the “subjective” and “objective” methods of sociological investigation. The “subjective”
theorists—by which he was mainly referring to the early phenomenologists—strove to
describe the social world as it was actually lived by their participants. While he
sympathized with this project, he felt that such research tended to emphasize the “taken
for granted” aspects of experience; such theorists failed to connect their subjects’ daily
lives to larger social structures, such as economies, systems of domination, and language.
On that score, “objective” researchers were more on target. Their approach overcame
some of subjectivism’s problematic tendencies, but its success largely came from
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ignoring the lived experience of its participants. In particular, it failed to acknowledge the
role scientific investigation itself played in research; after all, sociological models are not
literal descriptions of the lives of individuals but rather means for translating practices
into scientific discourse. People don’t actually behave in such a logical fashion—as he
puts it, “One can say that gymnastics is geometry so long as this is not taken to mean that
the gymnast is a geometer” (Logic 93). Objective theorists ignore that individuals must
continually adjust to the world’s shifting demands. Sociologists must connect individual
behaviors to social structures, but they also must never forget the chaotic nature of our
lives. To avoid confusing our models with reality, we must therefore consider the
interaction between the subjective and objective elements of experience.
Drawing from the metaphor of team sports, Bourdieu invites scholars to imagine
social structures like a field. Just as a game’s players are positioned in relation to their
competitors, we are also embedded inside a network of shifting relationships (Logic 6667). We are locked in a struggle for the most advantageous position, much like the
football player who switches directions to fool his opponents. The notion of a field
captures the sense that social arrangements, such as composition classrooms, are not
uniform entities but rather plurlalized structures composed of multiple individuals. When
we discuss the university, we have a desire to organize it neatly into disciplines, even if
this classification system is just a convenient fiction. After all, a discipline is composed
of numerous individuals, all of which are related to each other in a series of fluctuating
power relationships. From a distance, their practices might seem to cohere, but a closer
examination reveals that each individual is always jockeying for position; he/she is
responding to others through journals and electronic bulletin boards, seeking for a way to
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leverage his/her expertise to his/her advantage within the immediate social network. In
that sense, saying students are “acquiring a disciplinary discourse” ignores the practical
reality, which is that students are responding to particular individuals—namely, the
professors and students in their courses. Naturally, each of these individuals will have
their own peculiar tendencies, which means that students are forced to continually adjust
their practices to meet these changing demands.
An individual’s behaviors are locked in a dialectical relationship with the field.
Other social actors partially determine the shape of the individual’s actions, for he/she is
continually responding to their feedback. At the same time, the individual shapes the
field, for individual group members determine the boundaries of a social space. For
example, people are expected to wear certain clothes to formal events, although what is
viewed as appropriate varies among different individuals. Bourdieu’s term for these
cognitive dispositions is the habitus, which he defines as
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order
to attain them. (Logic 53)
These systems are structured in the sense that they are developed through our interaction
with the field. As we respond to the actions of other group members, we gain an intuitive
sense of how to move about the social space. The habitus is structuring in the sense that
it organizes how individuals perceive the world. To successfully play a game, a person
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must know how to respond to other players. To use one of Bourdieu’s favorite phrases,
an individual must develop a “feel for the game.” Much like the shape of the field is
determined by the habitus of the group, an individual’s habitus is shaped by how he/she
adjusts his/her dispositions to the behaviors of the field.
Due to the confusion of Bourdieu’s ideas with other structuration theorists, the
notion of habitus has been criticized as deterministic, even though this interpretation is at
odds with his own belief that the idea of habitus is what allows him to escape such
difficulties (Giroux; Nash; Jenkins; Turner, “Mirror Neurons”). The perplexing nature of
the habitus has caused some scholars to argue that Bourdieu advances two incompatible
social theories. In “Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: a ‘Practical’ Critique of the
Habitus,” Anthony King divides Bourdieu’s ideas into what he describes as his “practical
theory” and the habitus. As he argues, the “practical theory” emphasizes that “social
agents are ‘virtuosos’ who are not dominated by some abstract social principles but who
know the script so well that they can elaborate and improvise upon themes which it
provides and in the light of their relations with others” (419). In contrast, the habitus
specifies a unified collective entity—when people are socialized into a group, they
acquire a set of perceptual dispositions shared by all its members. In King’s view, the
habitus is therefore no different than the other collective entities that have posited
throughout the history of social theory. People are sometimes viewed as sharing a set of
“presuppositions” or “tacit rules” that guide their actions. In composition studies,
researchers commonly view people as operating under a shared “discourse” that shapes
their perspective of the world. The problem with these collective entities is that they
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inevitably open up the charge of determinism, largely because it is difficult to see how
people might change their practices if they are produced by a shared social entity.
When these collective entities are examined in more detail, their operation
ultimately seems mysterious. As Stephen Turner argues in The Social Theory of
Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions, the problem emerge the
moment we try to imagine how “discourses” or “tacit rules” are transmitted between
people—after all, previous generations don’t just open up our brains and “program” us
with a set of social practices. In Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social Theory after
Cognitive Science, Turner claims that such theories adhere to the “snap-on” model of the
learning process. The idea is that “the student tries this and tries that . . .and does all of
this without understanding. But at some point something clicks, and the student 'has' the
rule” (Brains 29). Because learning always takes place either through the medium of
language or from direct observation, it seems impossible for practices to ever be perfectly
transmitted through such a process. For that reason, social theorists have historically
resorted to positing the existence of transcendental entities—such as social structures or
the collective conscious—that are tapped into by learners. The idea is basically that
practices are downloaded from a mystical database. Of course, people are not literally
connected by cables to a computer network, so the question arises of where we might
locate these transcendental objects. While Bourdieu also questions the existence of
collective entities in his criticism of the “objective” structuration theorists, he also
sometimes lapses into language extremely reminiscent of these views. He talks about
how practices are “reproduced” almost like people are run through a transcendental copy
machine. At other times, he vaguely talks about perceptual “schemes” that somehow
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guide our actions. As Turner points out, even his dominant metaphor—the idea that
practices are something like a game—seems to rely on the existence of collective entities,
for games are after all structured by rules (“Mirror Neurons” 351).
While certain passages open him up to this criticism, Bourdieu emphasizes at
several points that he never intended the habitus to be viewed as a unified social
structure. In fact, when Bourdieu addresses the relationship between individual and
collective habitus, he directly states that a collective habitus should not be viewed as a
shared entity. As he explains, one mistaken way to understand the habitus is to imagine it
as a “subjective but non-individual system of internalized structures” (Logic 60). He
ultimately rejects this position because it would make practices “impersonal and
interchangeable” (60). Instead, he argues an individual habitus shares a set of family
resemblances with the larger habitus—as he puts it, “the singular habitus of members of
the same class are united in a relationship of homology, that is, of diversity within
homogeneity characteristic of their social conditions of production” (60). He emphasizes
that the reason people exhibit similar behaviors is not because they “acquire” something
that shapes their perceptions. Two people are not similar because they share a language—
on the contrary, their linguistic practices are the product of cognitive dispositions
developed in similar social conditions.
To help bring some clarity to this admittedly abstract argument, it might help to
think through what we mean when we say that people “share” a set of practices. One way
of understanding this sentence is to say that we share something in common inside our
minds like a discourse. Another way of understanding it is to say that we engage in what
seems like similar behaviors even though what is producing those actions in our brains
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might actually be extremely different. Consider the process of learning how to dance.
When we all arrive at the dance studio the first time, we all come from different places,
with some of us perhaps having a considerable amount of experience while other might
have never even done anything resembling a dance move. An instructor might begin by
establishing a set of explicit guidelines: he/she might discuss positions of the feet, general
principles for moving the hips, and offer other such “tips.” Of course, we all will react to
these instructions in different ways, with some of us picking up on them quickly while
others lapse into confusion. Then, the instructor might pair us up with other people, and
some of us will learn more effectively by working with our partners while others might
feel anxiety about the social interaction. After many years of dancing education, though,
we might all arrive at what most people would qualify as “competent dancing skills.”
However, the careful observer will notice subtle signs that what is going on inside our
heads is actually substantially different, perhaps by observing the unique styling that we
add to a particular technique.
Looking at practices in this way means acknowledging the importance of time.
Because the social world is always in flux, we must also acknowledge the role difference
plays in our lives. As we move throughout the day, we are continually confronted with an
array of new challenges, which leave what Turner describes as subtle “mental traces” that
influence the future direction of practices. We might have to ship off an e-mail to
customers at a new business, many of which we only briefly met at a company event. We
might be faced with a familiar task but find ourselves in a different mental state, perhaps
due to our emotions after receiving some bad news. Due to our continual encounters with
different situations, innovation must paradoxically be routine. Furthermore, as Bourdieu
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argues, innovation doesn’t necessarily require conscious intervention, whether it is
metacognition or one of its variants. Innovation is built into practice—without the ability
to react to changing circumstances, we would be nothing more than social robots. As he
explains, “To reintroduce uncertainty is to reintroduce time, with its rhythm, its
orientation and its irreversibility, substituting the dialectic of strategies for the mechanics
of the model, but without falling over into the imaginary anthropology of ‘rational actor’
theories” (Logic 99). Many binaries that plague our discussion of the mind break down in
Bourdieu’s system. Rather than make a sharp distinction between automatic routines and
conscious innovation, he imagines both as fundamental to practice and therefore triggered
at all levels of awareness.
Naturally, not all practices are perceived as having the same value. In the case of
language, different ways of speaking are viewed as being more respectable in certain
situations. To describe these unequal power relationships, Bourdieu uses the term capital.
Just as material goods are assigned different prices, practices also have a particular
cultural worth. In some cases, they can be directly exchanged for economic capital, such
as when a college graduate uses certain skills to obtain a job. To use one of Bourdieu’s
examples, he argues in Language and Symbolic Power that the bourgeois express disdain
for language associated with the body, such as “coarse” jokes and “crude” comments
(87). For the upper class, using such language is a sign of poor taste. On the other hand,
when politicians want to negotiate with the “regular folk,” they might use such language
to seem more “in touch” with the public’s concerns (68-69). Part of mastering a game
involves understanding the shifting values assigned to different strategies in the
marketplace.

18

One of the main advantages of Bourdieu’s framework is how it sets our social
lives in motion. Certainly, some fields privilege routine, but they are the exception. While
Bourdieu acknowledges the importance of habits, he views them as only a component of
practice. As he explains in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste,
practice might be best defined through the formula, “[(habitus)(capital)] + field =
practice.” (101). By this, he means that the term refers to how dispositions are deployed
in response to particular social arrangements. A practice is precisely this dialectical
relationship between cognitive dispositions and social structures. Bourdieu imagines
individuals as more than helpless creatures programmed by the surrounding culture.
Rather, they are virtuosos whose cognitive dispositions always allow for “regulated
improvisation” (Outline 79). In this shifting social landscape, a successful social actor
must do more than rigidly employ the same routines, lest they be outplayed by other
group members. He views individuals as continually adjusting their practices in response
to other individuals.
Chapter Summary
The second chapter argues the transfer concept causes researchers to portray
practices as commodities. While scholars rarely explicitly defend this position, it can be
seen primarily through their use of metaphors—in many cases, practices are represented
as physical things that learners “transfer” between physical locations, almost like a truck
shipping a product to a department store. The problem with this perspective is that it fails
to capture several characteristics of social practices. In particular, it neglects the way that
they often overlap and share resources—while it might seem that writing a business
memo and a short story are distinct activities, they both at least draw on certain basic
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syntactic skills, such as composing paragraphs and coherent sentences. Also, this model
provides a limited sense of how learners change over time. For example, if practices are
imagined as tools, then the only way for a student to learn is to acquire a new tool. As a
result, we frequently ignore how practices are transformed as students encounter new
situations. Due to many of these theoretical preconceptions, researchers have come to see
transfer as an intractable problem, mainly because they are unable to see how the “tools”
acquired in a particular situation can be directly applied to the writing tasks in a different
context.
The third chapter argues that current research has not adequately taken into
consideration the tacit dimension of writing practices, partially due to the lack of a model
for understanding the relationship between unconscious and conscious cognitive
processes. Drawing from the work of social theorists, phenomenologists, and expertise
researchers, I forward a model of the mind that sees the unconscious and conscious as
embedded in a dialectical relationship. As I point out, even if students claim that they
learned nothing valuable from their writing courses, they might have developed several
practices without their conscious awareness. Therefore, if we limit our research to just
methodologies that ask for retrospective accounts from our students, we risk only
developing a limited sense of what they learned from their courses. As an alternative, I
propose that we use a wider range of methodologies, including those that directly look at
composing behaviors, such as collecting student papers, examining revisions, and
conducting classroom observations. However, we not only need to broaden the types of
data that we collect, we also need to change how we interpret what our students say about
their experiences in writing courses. When students express skepticism about what they
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learned in their FYC course, we must recognize how various cultural ideologies influence
their opinions. In many cases, they might reflect their participation in peer groups and
disciplinary communities that view the English profession as involving primarily “fun”
writing activities with no relevance to the workplace. We need to be especially careful of
how we interpret accounts of student struggles, for they may simply reflect the
discomfort that all learners feel when they must adjust to a new practice.
The fourth chapter attempts to overcome some of the shortcoming of traditional
transfer theory. Part of the problem comes from what I call the “rhetoric of alignment,”
which is the belief that classroom activities should be as similar as possible to what
people do in the target context. Of course, one issue with this perspective is that it’s
impossible to fully know what students will do in the future—even if we were to teach
“professional writing,” we could never anticipate how the particularities of different
businesses might affect what people write in the workplace. Even more importantly,
though, is that this view doesn’t account for the importance of time. The world is always
in flux, so students will always need to adjust to emergence of new genres, technologies,
and social practices. Drawing from Bourdieu and actor-oriented transfer theorists, I argue
for a model of practice that views it as a temporal “coupling” between a person’s habitus
and their social environment. In this view, people are constantly in the process of
interpreting their surroundings, adjusting their behavior to accommodate new situations,
and selling others on effectiveness of their practices. As Bourdieu puts it, social actors are
best seen as “virtuous” that are continually improvising their practices to meet the needs
of a changing world.
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The final chapter outlines the implications of this theoretical model for future
transfer research. While I suggest some ways that we can revise our methodological
approaches to provide a more nuanced understanding of writing practices, my main
concern is how we can go about tackling the traditional preoccupations of transfer
research from a different perspective. One of the original impetuses behind transfer
research is how students deal with new challenges as they move throughout the
curriculum. Given that our main task as composition teachers is to prepare students for
future writing tasks, we want to know whether students actually use the strategies we
teach. However, if we concentrate too narrowly on whether students draw on certain
genres, we risk missing how they creatively employ practices learned throughout their
entire education. Of course, we need to be careful whenever we pull methodologies from
other disciplines, but research into naturalistic decision-making processes offers one
potentially useful approach. Studies in this area look at how people go about making
decisions in the flow of their activities, where they must deal with time pressures, high
stakes, unclear goals, and inadequate information. In particular, their emphasis on how
practitioners deal with “unexpected situations” is one strategy that could potentially be
used to examine how student navigate new writing tasks.
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CHAPTER II
THE COMMODIFICATION OF PRACTICE
This chapter’s main purpose is to draw attention to transfer as a concept, as a
metaphor that focuses our attention on certain aspects of the learning process. Whenever
we invoke a theoretical model, we always draw on a set of metaphorical resources. In this
case, they are rooted in the central concept of transfer; however, they emanate outwards
from this foundation, making links to neighboring ideas not explicitly under examination.
Sometimes, in our eagerness to solve scholarly problems, we forget that we are never
bound to a specific concept. We could talk rather convincingly about how students learn
without ever referencing the notion of transfer, let alone similar ideas like skill
acquisition. For instance, we could imagine the classroom as a struggle, where students
must learn to successfully negotiate between clashing cultures. We could see people as
learning a “feel for the game,” much like a chess player who eventually becomes able to
instinctively recognize the best moves. Each of these ideas draws from a different set of
metaphorical resources and therefore have their own insights and blind spots. Any
examination of transfer must ultimately start with the metaphor itself and what it brings
to the discussion.
When we reflect on the process of “transfer,” a variety of images immediately
come to mind. We might think of a person “transferring” between two different buses.
Alternatively, we could visualize money “transferring” between different bank accounts.
Or, for those of us in the educational system, we might imagine a student “transferring”
23

to a new school. While each of these examples are different in certain respects, they all
share two important features. First, what is being transferred is a unified object, a thing
that is being literally moved between two locations. Secondly, it is being transferred to a
place separated by concrete physical and spatial boundaries. At first glance, this
metaphor seems like a strange description of the learning process. After all, when a
person learns a practice, it doesn’t feel like an object; we can wield a sword, but we can’t
wield the ability to swing it. In the same fashion, a context doesn’t seem like a physical
location. If I initially learned how to calculate percentages in math class, I should be able
to use this skill to solve physics problems; however, these two tasks have fuzzy
boundaries, and it’s not entirely clear how to define the difference between these
contexts. While the transfer metaphor initially seems to eliminate some vagueness about
what happens during the learning process, this clarity is achieved through an analogy to
the simpler scenario of transporting objects.
This metaphor might remain attractive to cognitive scientists because of
widespread adherence to the computation theory of the brain, which views the mind as
little more than a symbolic processing machine that interprets stimuli through a set of
complex algorithms. From this perspective, we are born with genetic software that is used
to decode the surrounding environment; subsequently, incoming information is “stored”
in memory like on a computer chip. For that reason, early chess expertise researchers
speculated that masters must have thousands of board configurations stored in their brains
to successfully predict their opponents’ moves. For scholars operating under this
paradigm, the transfer metaphor might have seemed like a compelling explanation of how
people adapt skills to new contexts. After all, computers are constructed by humans, so
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the metaphors that explain their operation are drawn from physical objects. When bits of
data are recorded on an optical drive drive, this information is characterized as a “file,”
which is stored in “folders” that can be retrieved at a later date. As such, we can
understand why researchers might have been compelled by “transfer”; this process could
be easily imagined as the act of copying a “file” to a different “directory.” However,
recent movements in both social theory and psychology have brought into question this
view. In sociology, theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu have argued that while it is tempting
to imagine the mind as a rule-driven machine, this seems like an inadequate description
of actual social practices. In the realm of education research and psychology, figures like
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger have emphasized the numerous ways that the mind is
actively shaped by social factors. Indeed, the emerging consensus is that computational
psychology is inadequate for understanding both the brain’s neurological structure and
the enormous complexity of human cognition.
Given this trend, it is somewhat interesting that composition scholars have only
recently begun to draw from transfer studies. While computational models remain an
active force in many psychology departments, they have been largely discredited in
composition studies. In fact, one of the reasons that scholars turned away from Flower
and Hayes model of the composing process was because it represented the mind almost
like a symbolic processing machine (Bizzell 233-34). Of course, while the metaphor of
the “computer” is a popular way of understanding the brain, psychological theory has a
long history of explaining mental phenomenon through appeals to metaphors derived
from our daily lives. We also hear educators describe cognitive skills as “tools” that
students store in their “toolkits.” We talk about people “acquiring” genres, almost like
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they are putting an object in their pocket. We sometimes use the idea of “internalization,”
which is a metaphor reminiscent of biological research—the brain is seen as absorbing
something from the environment, almost like a substance passing through a cell
membrane.
The transfer metaphor is appealing partially because it builds on these metaphors
that we traditionally use to describe practices. In this view, skills are treated like unitary
things, like folders with records on various topics—knowledge, principles, lower-order
skills, and other information—which people draw from when handling their daily tasks.
When people learn something new about a skill, they are simply adding another record to
its pre-existing folder, which they can now draw from whenever they engage in similar
tasks in future situations. Therefore, when people “transfer” knowledge to new situations,
they are essentially moving records across the various folders in their mental filing
cabinet. Essentially, the process is similar to looking through previous records, finding
something useful, and moving it to a folder in a different location. David Hammer et al.
describe this as a “unitary ontology,” the tendency to imagine a “particular piece of
knowledge as an intact cognitive unit, in close correspondence with the observable idea
or behavior, be it a principle, fact, or procedure” (92). In this perspective, a cognitive skill
operates like a discrete entity, a “tool” people use to complete a task.
While Hammer et al.’s terminology is a step in the right direction, it does not
explain why it so appealing to depict practices as “intact cognitive units.” I want to argue
that this tendency stems from some flawed assumptions. Often, we view practices almost
like commodities that can be traded in the capitalist economy. In much of our public
discourse, we imagine the university almost like a “skills shop” where students can
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purchase the practices needed to become a successful employee in the business world.
My term for this perspective will be commodification. By invoking this concept, I’m
echoing the language of Allan Luke, who argues that genre scholars tend to view power
in this fashion. He claims that “in the current educational economy most contemporary
pedagogies tend to reify power, to turn power into an object in the world which can be
commoditised, containerised, and, quite literally, bought and sold on an educational
marketplace” (322). I’m also drawing from the work of Bruce Horner, who argues in
Terms of Work for Composition: A Materialist Critique that our focus on educational
outcomes sometimes results in treating “students, their skills, or their consciousness as
commodities” (18). Central to the process of commodification is the transformation of
practices into marketable things. While this word is often employed loosely in everyday
discourse, I will use it to refer to something specific—namely, an entity that is bound
together by a kind of internal glue, whether it be the laws of Newtonian physics, the rules
of logic, or some other mysterious phenomenon. When researchers view practices in this
way, they are treated almost like unitary objects that will remain unchanged unless
somehow disrupted by an external force.
To avoid this problematic tendency to imagine practices as commodities, my
recommendation is that we search for concepts that draw on a different set of
metaphorical resources. Just to clarify, my emphasis on de-commoditizing the mind
should not be confused with a desire to de-metaphorize it. Indeed, it is impossible to even
conceptualize a phenomenon without drawing a metaphorical comparison, whether it be
to physical objects or some other type of entity. My goal here is simply to demonstrate
the myriad of ways that writing skills are commoditized in composition research.
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Sometimes, this process is overt, such as when Russell directly compares genres to
physical tools. However, in some instances, commodification can be more subtle, such as
the numerous cases of scholars portraying discourse communities and contexts with
clearly bounded locations. As I hope to demonstrate, commodification is prevalent in
certain strands of composition research, despite the numerous attempts to undermine such
tendencies.
Practices as Unitary Things
Compositions scholars frequently examine writing practices through the lens of
genre theory, which has its origins in literary criticism, rhetorical studies, and linguistics.
While researchers have certainly utilized other approaches, I want to focus on this model
because of its historical importance to transfer research. Many studies have been directly
formulated in terms of genre (Freedman; Wardle; Artemeva). In addition, many
researchers have claimed that genres are best learned within their target context, which is
part of the reason we must be skeptical about the possibility of transferring skills from
writing courses to other environments (Russell; Freedman). Finally, while genre theorists
have not always directly invoked the transfer concept, their work often explores similar
issues; in fact, the recent interest in transfer studies stems directly from problems
originally formulated by genre theorists, especially Freedman’s arguments against
explicit teaching and Russell’s “activity system” approach. At the moment, genre theory
is the dominant model of writing practices among transfer researchers in our discipline.
When rhetoricians trace the history of North American genre theory, they often
begin by highlighting the importance of Carolyn Miller’s “Genre as Social Action,”
which first articulated the seminal notion that genres are not linguistic forms but rather
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typified responses to recurring situations. Central to her theory is the notion of an
exigence, which is a situation that invites a certain kind of action. Over time, certain
exigences have a tendency to reoccur, which results in the development of consistent,
institutionalized textual responses by members of a particular group. While several
motivations likely drove Carolyn Miller’s work, one of her primary concerns was
overcoming the view that genres are just rigid textual forms. As she argues, a
“rhetorically sound definition of genre must be centered not on the substance or the form
of the discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish” (151). Or, at another point, she
claims that “a genre is not just a pattern of forms or even a method of achieving our own
ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have” (165). She believed that
equating genres with forms was one of the main problems that plagued traditional genre
theory.
As a result of this aspect of Miller’s work, contemporary scholarship is filled with
denunciations of any effort to equate “genres” with “forms.” Medway argues that while
“genres are still expected to display characteristic textual forms . . . identifying patterns
of text format, syntactical and lexical choice, and discursive ordering, however, is no
longer considered sufficient for pinning down the genre” (123). In Writing Genres, Devitt
argues, “form alone cannot define genre. Theoretically, equating genre with form is
tenable only within a container model of meaning, for it requires a separation of generic
form from a particular text’s content” (9-10). In “Rethinking Genre in School and
Society: An Activity Theory Analysis,” Russell argues that “we must go beyond the
conventional notion of genre as a set of formally definable text features that certain texts
have in common across various contexts” (513). While genre theory has helped combat
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the notion that writing involves just following a set of formulas, the problem is that
researchers have tended to focus narrowly on a particular metaphor—in the case, the
tendency to equate writing practices with forms—even though this is just one example of
how researchers commidify writing practices. In reality, the difficulty is with an entire
class of metaphors that reduces writing practices to unified things.
A metaphor that reduces writing practices to commodities ultimately runs into
three problems. First, it has trouble explaining the mental overlap between practices.
While we are accustomed to viewing skills as stored in isolated containers, this view has
difficulty explaining how learners build on previous practices and adapt them to new
contexts. Practices must somehow share mental resources—otherwise, each time we
faced a new learning situation, we would be forced to start with a blank slate. Secondly,
these metaphors also create the problem of location. Obviously, if practices operate like
commodities, we must have some sort of process for acquiring them. However,
experienced practitioners are not simply able to dump the contents of their minds directly
into future generations. Interactions between individuals always must be filtered through
language, which rules out the possibility of ever achieving the perfect transmission. For
that reason, social theorists have historically resorted to positing the existence of
transcendental entities—such as social structures and the collective conscious—that
learners must internalize. The idea is basically that practices are downloaded from some
kind of mystical database. Of course, people are not literally connected by cables to a
computerized network, so the question arises of where we might find these mysterious
transcendental objects. Finally, a potential metaphor must also deal with the problem of
change. When we visualize most commodities, we imagine them as only slightly
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changing with the passing of time. A hammer might achieve some wear from frequent
use, but it still essentially remains the same object. In contrast, humans are inextricably
embedded in the flow of history. We are thrown into a world of pre-existing social
relations, where people already have an investment in certain practices and therefore
encourage their development in future generations. Our interactions in this environment
leave traces on our mind and influence our future actions. We also continually face new
situations, which subtly shape our current perceptions and sometimes radically transform
our practices.
Unfortunately, while the transfer literature is filled with example of scholars
dismissing the idea that genres can be reduced to textual forms, many theorists invoke
different metaphors that still commidify practices in various ways. David Russell’s work
is perhaps the most prominent example of this issue. In his numerous attempts to inject
activity theory into genre studies, he has drawn from a variety of metaphors. While he
sometimes compares to practices to games, he more commonly refers to genres as “tools”
that people use to accomplish various purposes. In “Activity Theory and its Implications
for Writing Instruction,” he describes activity systems as “goal-directed, historically
situated, cooperative interactions,” providing the examples of a “child's attempt to reach
an out-of-reach toy, a job interview, a date, a social club, a classroom, a discipline, a
profession, an institution, [or] a political movement” (53). He argues that activity systems
have three components: (1) subjects, which range from individuals to social groups, (2)
objectives that the subjects strive to achieve, and (3) “mediational means,” tools that
allow members of the activity system use to accomplish their objectives. These tools
include physical objects, such as shovels, and semiotic ones, such as written genres.
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Members of an activity system might accomplish their objectives through the use of
several tools—for example, if a pothole exists in a road, a construction worker might
personally fill it with a machine, or he/she might choose to fill out a work order. These
tools are defined by the activity system, to the extent that plumbers and carpenters could
be described as using fundamentally different “hammers.”
As Amy Devitt argues in Writing Genres, Russell's work supports two
possibilities for genre's role in an activity system. At one point, Russell defines genre as
“variance in semiotic tools according to the activity,” which seems to indicate that genres
are not exactly tools but how tools are used in activity systems (54). At other times,
Russell equates genres with tools, such as when he argues that “using a certain genre of
writing (a certain kind of semiotic tool) as part of an activity system is like using the
gearshift of a car (a certain kind of mechanical tool) as part of [an] activity system” (70).
The problematic thread that unites these two interpretations is the involvement of tools.
As Devitt explains, the problem is that once genre is associated with semiotic tools, it is
no longer conceived primarily “as an action . . . [which] diminishes the role of people in
creating and using genres” (47). In addition, imagining genre as a tool “limit[s] the nature
of genre to formal formulae, a preexisting, static, material object that people can pick up
and use or just as easily set aside” (48). While viewing genres as the routinized use of
tools escapes this dilemma, the problem is that a person's actions are still bounded by the
constraints of the semiotic tool. Two subjects might use a hammer in a different way, but
we still call it a “hammer” because it has physical features that remain stable outside of a
particular activity system.
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This metaphor produces all three of the problems that often arise from
commidifying practices. First, it becomes difficult to imagine the mental overlap between
different skills, mainly because of the comparison to material tools. While a hammer and
a screwdriver might share some features on an abstract, conceptual level, they remain
discrete physical objects, which are stored in different compartments of a person's mental
toolkit. The theory fails to account for how writing a personal statement might involve
some of the mental components that are used in other genres, such as non-fiction
narratives. Secondly, this view of semiotic tools introduces the problem of location. The
reason that mechanical tools can be acquired is because they are material objects. They
can be purchased from department stores, borrowed from friends, and constructed at
factories. Semiotic tools are not objects with the same properties; therefore, acquisition
only occurs on the metaphorical level. In that sense, acquisition—and other similar verbs,
such as internalization—are misleading ways of describing learning, which involves a
complex process of modifying old skills and developing new ones. Thirdly, this view of
genre introduces the problem of change, particularly as it relates to how learners might
modify practices for use in future contexts. Imagine a novice homeowner that only owns
a shovel. If he/she is faced with the need to fix a staircase, he/she has limited options for
completing this task. The homeowner could attempt to use the shovel to drive nails into
the wood, but this solution is not ideal; for him/her to accomplish his/her objectives, the
best strategy is to acquire more suitable tools. Unless a new situation requires the same
tool, it is difficult to imagine how a learner would build on previously acquired practices
to accomplish a new set of objectives.
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Of course, many theorists explicitly avoid reducing genres to “tools,” although
such language remains popular among many scholars. In fact, even Russell seems to
recognize the limitations of this approach, which is the reason that he emphasizes that
genres are “typified ways of interacting with tools” (408). Viewed in this way, genres
become more like the habitual way of using a tool in an activity system. This solves the
problem of location, for habits are acquired through observing the behavior of other
people; for example, we can watch how an expert carpenter grips a saw, ask him/her for
some general advice, and then practice it ourselves with his/her guidance. We also have
somewhat solved the problem of overlap—if I learn the genre of “saw carpentry,” aspects
of this genre might help me use tools in other activity systems; for example, if an expert
carpenter tells me, “always remember to let the saw do the work,” I might employ this
technique to help me avoid applying too much force when hammering a nail. However,
this conception of genre derives its explanatory power by an appeal to a different
concept—namely, that of habituation. In fact, this theory gains its strength by explicitly
diminishing the theoretical function of “tool.” Indeed, it is difficult to fully understand
the role played by “semiotic tools” in this framework. The difficulty is that it is not
problematic to talk about habitual ways of using physical tools because they are material
objects. While they might be used differently depending on the activity system, their
material form will remain constant regardless of the circumstances. In contrast, a semiotic
tool has no such material existence. As such, once we begin viewing “genres” as
“habitual ways of using semiotic tools,” the identity of the “tools” becomes a mystery.
The only recourse seems to be depicting genres as textual forms. However, the whole
point of contemporary genre theory is to move beyond such problematic comparisons.

34

Interestingly, even though Devitt spends considerable time developing a similar
critique of Russell’s work, she likewise commodifies writing practices in her equation of
genres to “cultural software.” What makes this move fascinating is her deliberate effort
throughout Writing Genres to avoid reducing genres to unified entities; she continually
resists the attempt to reduce genres to forms, which actually serves as her primary
rationale for questioning Russell’s approach. In Devitt’s case, she appeals to the notion of
“cultural software” in her explanation of how genres change over time. In her mind, one
of the problems with existing rhetorical theory is the tendency to see genres as either
allowing for certain textual choices or inhibiting a writer’s freedom. As she explains, we
often associate generic constraint with slavery, as if any restrictions placed on the writer
is somehow equivalent to their minds being shackled by the chains of tradition. However,
communication would not be possible without some kind of standard. For two people to
successfully communicate, they must be utilizing a similar set of linguistic practices. On
the other hand, while some convergence must exist among speakers, there also must be
divergence; in any effort to produce an utterance that meets the needs of a particular
rhetorical situation, we must come up with a novel combination of words, phrases, and
other elements. As she explains, “when I write the sentence I am writing now, I am
writing a sentence I have never written before . . . in fact, all of the sentences in this
paragraph, all of our nonroutine utterances, are new and original in some basic way”
(140). In this view, we are always drawing on our existing generic resources and weaving
them together into innovative patterns. Therefore, constraint and choice should not be
viewed as opposing forces; instead, we should imagine them as complementary impulses:
“Janus-like, genres inevitably look both ways at once, encompassing convergence and
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divergence, similarity and difference, standardization and variation, constraint and
creativity” (162). Her main objective is to demonstrate that some standards are necessary
for the creative process. In addition, these constraints have ideological origins, which
means genres are not politically innocent and serve the interests of certain cultural
groups.
The problem arises from her explanation of the origin of these generic resources,
which she explains by invoking J. M. Balkin’s notion of “cultural software.” While his
original theory likely holds numerous complexities, my goal is not necessarily to
challenge his work but rather how Devitt utilizes it. Much like Russell, she demonstrates
a certain amount of ambivalence about her metaphor, but she justifies its use by
explaining that Balkin “treats cultural information as tools for human cognition, ways of
understanding the world, without which humans would be unable to make meaning”
(138). Later, she goes on to say that “genres, as part of cultural information or ‘software,’
helps humans understand their experience, as created and transmitted by other humans,
and preserve stability while allowing change and creativity” (138). It is interesting that
her argument makes use of the same tool metaphor that she critiques in Russell’s work;
however, the more important issue is the metaphorical resources invoked by the notion of
“cultural software.” One advantage of the term is that it immediately makes concrete how
people acquire textual practices; in this model, writers are viewed as downloading genres
from a vast cultural network. It also provides an explanation for the rule-like appearance
of our linguistic interactions. “Programs” are nothing more than a sequence of logical
rules for dealing with incoming data, which means that to explain the convergence
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between how people respond to similar rhetorical situations, we might compare them to
two computers executing the same software.
Of course, this metaphor introduces similar problems to those created by the
notion of tools. To a limited extent, it avoids the problem of overlap between genres, for
programs often draw from similar resources—on a basic level, they all utilize the
structure created by the operating system. In addition, they sometimes draw on a common
set of software for certain functions, including various movie players, internet browsers,
graphical drivers, and compression algorithms. However, it is an open question about
whether we feel this way while actually using programs. When we open up some word
processing software on the screen, we often imagine its existence as distinct from our
internet browser, even though both programs often share many resources. In addition, we
see ourselves as copying these programs wholesale between different locations; we
“download” programs from the internet, and we then “copy” files onto our hard drive.
However, the problem of location becomes even more prominent with this particular
metaphor. While software is often downloaded from a network of computers, human are
not connected by a set of internet cables. We also don’t have optical drives for storing
information. The temptation is to argue that the programs are stored in a transcendent
metaphysical location, but she explicitly rejects such a move; as she points out, “such
cultural software is created and transmitted by human beings; it does not exist as some
suprastructure or system independent of the people using it” (158). Therefore, the
immediate question is how we might obtain such software.
Her appeal once again is to a vague metaphor that operates as a shortcut for the
learning process. While Russell’s preferred term was acquisition, she instead draws from
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the notion of transmission. However, this concept immediately introduces the limits of
the idea of cultural software. When a computer transmits a piece of data to another
location, this movement ultimately involves transporting a file wholesale between
contexts; if a person copies a text document onto a flash drive, he/she should be able to
open the exact same file at a different location. As a result, this metaphor seems to
indicate that two people will have identical textual practices. However, as Devitt
continually emphasizes, genres often feature tremendous variation, to the extent that each
individual linguistic performance is to a certain extent a completely novel utterance. The
problem is that software never deviates from its programmed capabilities. In contrast,
people are continually diverging from expectations and blurring practices into novel
forms.
To resolve these difficulties, Devitt introduces the distinction between perfect and
imperfect transmission. As she explains, “what keeps such ideological power from
overwhelming the benefits of genres . . . is that genres are still created and transmitted by
individuals, by human beings with all their imperfections, including the imperfect
transmission of ideology” (161). Therefore, a genre is never “replicated exactly the same
in each individual” (161). Unfortunately, this proposed solution generates two new
problems. First, if we frame the transmission as an imperfect one, then we implicitly
assign a set of objectives to the learning process—namely, the ideal of perfect
transmission, which is the exact reproduction of a cultural practice in another individual.
Secondly, the notion of imperfect transmission is strained on a metaphorical level. When
programs are copied between two computers, the transmission necessarily involves the
duplication of identical programs. In fact, when the transmission is imperfect, the files
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become corrupted; what is created is not an exciting new program but rather a useless
piece of digital trash. Once again, my point is not that we need to abandon metaphors for
understanding practices. Indeed, it is impossible to conceptualize the mind without
making such concrete comparisons. However, we need to resist metaphors that equate
learning with transporting objects between locations. Practices are not things that are
transmitted, copied, or internalized by learners.
Unfortunately, programs are not the only metaphor that depicts the mind as
operating through a set of rules. Many researchers have also compared writing skills to
games, which is appealing partially because they are defined by “rules” that restrict the
player’s possible actions. The most prominent use of this metaphor is Russell’s ball game
analogy, which has proved especially convincing to transfer researchers (Smit; Downs
and Wardle; Bergmann and Zepernick). To quote Smit’s summary of the analogy, “the
ability to use a ball is a particular skill to be used in a particular manner in a particular
context, and we would expect the skill of being able to use a ball in a certain way to be
transferred only to other similar uses” (120). In the same way, writing in a genre requires
learning how to play the “game” of an activity system, and no guarantee exists the skills
learned in one context will necessarily apply to future ones. A practice will only
“transfer” when the situation is similar enough to draw upon the same cognitive
resources.
Let me begin by distinguish between two different ways of comparing games and
writing practices. First, we can conceive of writing as like playing a game. In many
respects, the metaphor gains its persuasiveness because of our sense that writing is often
a game-like practice—i.e, it contains the same mixture of seriousness and playfulness that
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characterize most sports. When we are putting together a resume, we talk about “gaming
the system,” as if the task is to predict the audience’s reactions and somehow bamboozle
them. Secondly, it also accurately captures the temporal element of textual practices. If a
colleague passes along a memo that suggests the company might eliminate our
department, this action will set in motion a series of textual responses, some which might
be tactical attempts to position ourselves in such a way that we will avoid being laid off.
Anne Freadman accurately captures this strategic element of writing in “Anyone for
Tennis?,” which she begins by comparing writing to players exchanging tennis balls.
Indeed, if we imagine writing as like playing a game, the comparison illuminates a great
deal about the writing process, especially how it always involves the act of responding to
other people.
Alternatively, writing can also be imagined as a game. Much like games are
defined by a set of constitutive rules, genres can be seen as distinguished by the same
type of rigid boundaries. When scholars use the metaphor in this fashion, writers are
imagined as carrying a set of rules in their heads that determine how they engage in
textual practices. Of course, if people want to successfully communicate, they must be
equipped with the same rules; otherwise, they will be playing different games, much like
two chess players who fail to agree on the movement of the game pieces. As Freadman
points out, the difficulty with this metaphor is that “it suggests that once you have learnt
the rules . . . the playing of a correct game following automatically, like the output of a
simple algorithmic programme in a computer.” She argues that certain ways of framing
the metaphor make writing seem like nothing more than following a recipe (46). As she
emphasizes, we must avoid confusing understanding how to play a game with its rules.
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Obviously, while many people are capable of regurgitating chess rules, only a fraction
them know how to actually play; the rules are at best a set of training wheels used during
the learning process. In addition to knowing the rules, people must develop a “feel for the
game.” They must learn to interpret the broader strategies used by their opponents. In
addition, they need to be capable of instinctively respond to these moves by employing
an assortment of tactics. As Freadman argues, the rules only determine the range of
possible actions. The actual play is determined by other factors, such as the player’s
previous experiences and his/her cultural background.
Interestingly, even though Freadman notes these difficulties, she remains unable
to move beyond the idea that people carry around a set of rules in their heads that shapes
their social practices. In fact, her essay could be viewed as an effort to somehow
rehabilitate the notion of rules. To help explain the variety of behaviors that constitute
playing the game, she introduces the notion of a ceremonial, which she defines as “games
that situate other games: they are the rules for the setting of a game, for constituting
participants as players in that game, for placing and timing it in relation with other places
and times” (47). At another point, she explains that ceremonies involve “the warm-up, the
toss, and, at the end, the declaration of the winner and closing down rituals—showers,
presentation, or the drink at the bar” (46). Her argument seems to be that the game is not
just determined by its rules; it also is shaped by its surrounding cultural rituals. To give a
simple example, polo and lacrosse would likely encompass much more indecorous
strategies if they were not perceived as genteel sports. In addition, poker might not
involve the same degree of deception and bluffing if it were not seen as housed in
working-class bars. Unfortunately, the ceremony metaphor fails to overcome the larger
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problem, mainly because it simply adds a new layer of rules. As she points out,
ceremonies are “the rules for the playing of a game, but they are not the rules of the
game” (47). In fact, as she continually emphasizes, they can essentially be imagined as a
different type of game; she only chose to retain both terms for “tactical purposes” (46).
The question then naturally becomes whether ceremonials also operate like “recipes.”
Obviously, if people conduct rituals simply by executing the rules in their heads, then it is
not clear how Freadman avoids reducing people to rule-driven machines.
We might be tempted to argue that ceremonies themselves are also embedded in
other games—as I pointed out, lacrosse is often seen as a genteel sport, while poker is
viewed as having working-class origins. We could say that people have learned to play a
wide range of games, which have been partially developed from their race, sexuality,
class, and gender backgrounds. In this view, the only reason the “game” metaphor seems
machine-like is because we only interact with a limited number of tightly bounded
games, while the human mind in fact contains the rules for thousands of games that it
executes for various reasons depending on the circumstances. The issue then becomes
one of complexity. The idea is that if we could stack up an enormous number of rules, we
would have a worthy model for how the mind operates in daily life. In fact, computer
scientists originally took this approach in artificial intelligence research, and their efforts
have only been successful within certain highly restricted domains, such as a playing
chess and moving blocks. As Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus explain, the
thought was that the computer only needed specific facts and a set of rules for
determining the appropriate action. However, researchers quickly discovered that minds
don't operate through such internal recipes. Imagine that you wanted to construct a
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computer that could drive a vehicle. To design such a program, one would presumably
start by downloading an encyclopedia of traffic knowledge into a storage device.
Unfortunately, this would not be enough, for the machine would not know how to process
such information; therefore, one would also need to include a set of rules for calling upon
the facts necessary for a certain situation. One might instruct the computer to stay within
the traffic lines, and this would be reasonable for most situations—but once again, this
would not be sufficient, for exceptions always exist to all seemingly universal rules. A
car might veer into the lane, a pedestrian might suddenly walk across the street, or the
lines might disappear in a traffic zone. As a result, one needs a set of rules for dealing
with the exceptions to the normal rules; then, one needs a set of rules for determining
exceptions to these exceptions. In other words, the mind seems to behave “as if”
following rules, but when examined in its full complexity, it appears to have an almost
infinite capacity for adapting to new situations.
The reason that the game metaphor initially seems compelling is because it
convincingly captures the mixture of constraint and possibility that seems to characterize
our lives. Games have two properties that make them an appealing model for
understanding social practices. First, a game’s rules construct a space for a set of actions
that otherwise would not exist. If someone had never devised the game of chess, we
would have never even considered moving about pieces in such peculiar ways. But the
rules also define the game’s limits—players could not start deciding to arbitrarily move
pieces in a different fashion, for the game would ultimately become meaningless. In the
same way, our textual practices also seem to have these features. If we are writing a
business memo, we probably shouldn’t begin with a prose-poem, unless we have some
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compelling reason to deviate from the standard approach. To put this another way, the
metaphor seems to explain why people don’t engage in certain behaviors; we can
stipulate that the reason someone would never leave the house naked is because he/she
has a tacit “rule” stating that nudity is only appropriate in certain situations. The problem
with this perspective is that it imagines the mind as a device of infinite possibility that is
“restrained” by culture. At one point, Freadman argues that “ceremonial rules” are
perhaps viewed more like etiquette. In her opinion, this new metaphor is useful because it
helps us resist viewing rules as fixed laws; rather, they operate more like “good
manners,” which we recognize as somewhat arbitrary and continually renegotiated.
However, she insists that even this view is a fiction, which usually operates “in a group
that thinks of itself as unregulated by anything but spontaneity and fellow-feeling. Such
rules, like the rules of genre or a ceremony, are there ‘to make things work’” (58). The
idea here is that without some kind of internalized rules, our behavior would essentially
be open to any possibility. But the mind is not an infinitely powerful organ. From the
moment we leave the womb, our genetic faculties are shaped by culture. No source of
spontaneous free will exists inside our flesh that must be restrained; we are always
already open to only a limited range of actions.
Like the other attempts at commodification, the problem with the game metaphor
is that it begins with a unified object and then attempts to transform it into some kind of
“tacit” mental entity. The problem is that once we start to examine cognitive skills, they
don’t seem like the rule-governed behaviors that are suggested by the comparison. When
we are referring to a game, we are talking about an activity governed by explicit rules,
ones that can be easily recalled as knowable facts. When we claim that a person “knows
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the rules of football,” it does not make sense that they only have tacit knowledge; if
he/she was unable to immediately tell us that a touchdown is worth six points, we would
probably start to doubt his/her knowledge of the sport. The rules must be explicit for
them to define the game’s limits. Otherwise, they would not help resolve in-game
disputes. In contrast, most writing practices seem like they are not governed by such
rules. At best, some might be regularized enough that they seem “as if” they follow rules;
however, even in these rare cases, the basic patterns often disguise a substantial amount
of variation. Even if we limit our discussion to actual games, the logic that defines them
mostly by their rules seems questionable. They might be a game’s most recognizable
feature, but they do little more than establish the range of possible actions. While the
objective of football is to move the ball into the end zone, this “rule” says little about the
actual play, which is informed by an entire history of strategies that is being continually
refined by players. The “rules” also say little about the game’s place in the larger culture;
surely, football would be a different sport if it had not become a national pastime and
come under the management of wealthy elites. It would also be much different if
separated from its working class roots. Indeed, to be fully understood, a game must be
imagined as a social practice, which seems incapable of being reduced to a set of rules.
These three metaphors are only some examples of commodification. We have a
long history of using similar terms, including verbs that suggest students “internalize”
skills or comparisons that make writing seem like a theory guided by tacit “assumptions.”
The problem is that all these metaphors make skills seem like things held together by
some kind of internal glue, so that when we try to imagine how a student would
“transfer” a practice, we become convinced that it must be moved wholesale between
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contexts—to put this in the language of one of the metaphors, we have trouble imagining
how students might utilize their previous skills to play a game with different rules. If we
want to develop a more accurate view of how students learn, we need a more powerful
model. After all, writers are continually moving between rhetorical situations, and they
seem perfectly capable of drawing on their experiences to accomplish new tasks.
Contexts as Bounded Places
The previous section focused on the tendency among genre theorists to represent
practices as commodities, which people internalize through their involvement with
certain social groups. But this discussion only deals with part of the transfer metaphor. If
we once again visualize the process of transfer, we will recall that it involved transporting
a practice between two contexts, which are frequently imagined almost like places in the
material world. While the term place is employed loosely in our daily speech, I will use it
to refer to a space with clearly marked boundaries. Even when the concept is applied to
physical locations, it is merely as a convenient fiction that enables the commodification
of space. If material space was viewed as a common resource shared by all biological
creatures, we could not restrict access to spaces and sell them in the marketplace. Given
that we spend our lives moving between such commodified places, it is relatively easy to
view our social world in this way; however, as many scholars have pointed out over the
last couple decades, viewing contexts like places creates a number of problems.
One formulation of this view that has been criticized by many scholars is the
notion of discourse communities. In this view, what creates intelligibility among certain
people, whether they are scientists, rural farm workers, or politicians, is a shared
discourse, a common way of describing and thinking about the world. The danger with
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the metaphor is that it sometimes leads scholars to adopt a monolithic picture of social
groups. Many “discourse community” models suffer from what Paul Prior describes as
“structuralist” tendencies, where language communities are viewed as “discrete,
autonomous territories with core regions constructed from common language,
knowledge, values, and rules” (18). As Marilyn Cooper observes, the concept can be seen
as implying that “features such as shared values, conventions of language, and norms of
behavior” are nothing more than “static standards that are used to determine who is and
who is not a member of the community” (204). In “The Idea of Community in the Study
of Writing,” Joseph Harris suggests that instead of seeing academic work as taking place
in a “single cohesive community,” we should instead use the metaphor of the city, which
captures the sense of a place consisting of multiple, competing languages (20). The
problem is that discourse community models only satisfyingly explain two phenomenon:
(1) the cohesion obtained between the practices of a group’s members and (2) how they
differentiate themselves from participants of other groups. Unfortunately, the metaphor is
less effective at explaining that heterogeneity and historicity of communities, whose
members are embedded in shifting power relationships and are continually struggling to
define the group’s identity.
Perhaps the most striking example of these problems in the transfer literature is
Anne Beaufort’s work, whose recent longitudinal research examines the development of
a single student as he moves throughout the curriculum. To offer a detailed picture of his
writing practices, her data comes from a wide range of sources, including students
interviews, writing samples, evaluators’ comments, classroom observations, and various
course materials. Her analysis is framed via a model of writing expertise that was
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developed in her previous work. She imagines writing practices as composed of five
overlapping components, including discourse community knowledge, genre knowledge,
writing process knowledge, rhetorical knowledge, and subject matter knowledge. The
largest of these domains is discourse community knowledge, which she visually depicts
as a large circle that encompasses the other four aspects of writing expertise. As she
argues, discourse communities are “based on a set of shared goals and values and certain
material/physical conditions . . . [and] establish norms for genres that may be unique to
the communities” (19). At the outset, I want to acknowledge that she acknowledges that
“discourse community” is a contested concept. However, while she recognizes the
difficulties with the metaphor, she still has a tendency to represent contexts as places with
clearly marked boundaries.1 She frequently fails to acknowledge the heterogeneity that
can exist within a single classroom.
For example, she rarely comments about how her research subject's ideological
commitments might have influenced his development. In fact, we discover little about the
student's background, aside from some interesting moments in the interviews. At one
point, we discover that he is religious, which directly influenced his decision to pursue
certain essay topics. As he explains, “I’m a Christian, so that’s kind of interesting to see

At one point, Beaufort seems to anticipate my critique of her work. As she explains, some people might
accuse her of viewing her categories as “stable” entities; however, people of this “philosophical bent”
confuse a model that depicts writing practices as “distinct yet overlapping categories” with one that
imagines “those categories are fixed and discreet” (21). Later, she claims that her goal is “not to win some
philosophical argument about the nature of truth” but “to try to get a more fine-grained and unified sense of
what is going on when we study student behaviors and a broader view of what we should consider in
creating writing curricula” (22). I agree that a model should not be criticized as “essentialist” simply
because it deploys categories. In fact, I would argue that ultimately we need to categorize a phenomenon in
order to operationalize a theoretical model. Once again, the problem is not with categories but with
metaphors that guide our thinking in problematic ways. As I hope to demonstrate, she seems to
conceptualize discourse communities as clearly marked places once she actually uses her framework to
interpret the data.
1
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my own kind of heritage and kind of how . . . I guess it helps personally understand what
can go wrong in a church” (75). This aspect of his identity directly impacted how he
imagined historical discourse. He often felt spiritual subjects were excluded from the
scholarly conversation: “In some respects I still feel like it’s outside the realm of history .
. . well, we don’t look at the supernatural. We don’t deal with this here, okay?” (75). In
addition, this focus caused him to avoid certain courses, which resulted in his exposure to
only a limited range of historical writing practices In particular, he avoided courses on
“the race/gender theme” because it seemed too “all-consuming” (75). Therefore, while
we might loosely talk about the “context” of a history course, we must acknowledge that
individual students will largely operate in different “contexts” depending on their
previous experiences. In this case, the student’s religious background directly influenced
what he learned from the curriculum. His writing development was also likely affected by
his race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, which partially explains his aversion to
particular courses. His education might have been impacted by a variety of other factors,
such as his relationship with other students and his perceptions of individual teachers.
Partially because of how university classrooms are being conceptualized, many of these
elements are rendered invisible.
While her research is more sensitive to the fractured nature of academic
disciplines, she rarely acknowledges that part of the learning process is learning how to
navigate these conflicts. Instead, she seems to imagine the student’s task as learning a set
of clearly defined writing practices, such as beginning an essay with a concise thesis
statement. Throughout her discussion of the student’s transition from freshmen
composition, we get little sense of how the student coped with the different conceptions
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of “writing” that he faced in his history courses. Interestingly, the student highlights
many of these complexities in his interviews. As I previously mentioned, he was aware of
the “race/gender” courses, which promoted a certain “line of thought and analysis” (75).
He also talks about a professor who considered himself as a “futurist,” which meant that
he used historical facts to make predictions about future events. In contrast, he also knew
a professor who dealt entirely with past events and believed history was mostly
unpredictable (74-75). Each of these different perspectives makes a claim about what is
valued in a historical interpretation. As Beaufort herself notes, the features of historical
genres are difficult to discern because no standard exists of “what ‘counts’ as historical
proof, i.e. what precise types of warrants and claims constitute the rhetorical features of
an argument in history” (71). As the student moved between classes, he was likely
confronted with a dizzying array of writing practices. Part of “learning to write” involves
making a decision about where one stands on such issues. Students must become
acquainted enough with the range of practices that exist in a particular group to know
how to effectively position themselves within this conflicting web of relationships.
These problems are compounded by her desire to classify transfer as either
“positive” or “negative.” Many transfer researchers seem motivated by a desire to smooth
over the fractures in the curriculum, which can be seen by the fact that many studies
involve simply cataloging the disjunctions that students experience when writing in
different contexts. In Beaufort’s description of the struggle that her student faced when
writing for his history courses, she describes numerous instances of “negative transfer”
where he “inappropriately” applied strategies from first-year composition. At one point,
she claims that “the genre of the ‘essay’ in freshmen writing was characterized largely as
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a loose exploration of a topic, whereas in history, for the most part, [his] professors
wanted focused, linear arguments” (104). In addition, historical essays focused “on
textual analysis or comparisons of sources from ‘objective’ points of view, whereas in
[his] freshmen writing classes the emphasis was on self-exploration and connecting
personal interest to wider social issues” (104). The suggestion is that this “disjuncture”
ultimately hampered the student’s development. However, his actual statements seem to
indicate that his first-year writing course provided him with a framework for resisting
some of the writing practices in his history courses. He directly states that he “sometimes
value[s] the flow in the writing over the step-by-step kind of point-by-point analysis”
(90). In fact, he argues, “So people will be able to say, yeah, well, what about this? Then
I’d have an answer for that, but I don’t want to bring it up myself because it gets in my
way . . . valuing the rhetoric, you know, over the substance” (90). While we might not
necessarily agree with his rationale, this statement reveals a writer who is aware of the
relevant discourse conventions but who has chosen another path for ideological reasons.
His deliberate attempt to position himself in a certain way demonstrates a student who is
starting to learn that communities are not homogenous entities and in fact tolerate
multiple conflicting practices.
Unfortunately, the tendency to label any kind of struggle as evidence of flaws in
the curriculum is a regular theme in transfer research. In “A Stranger in Strange Lands: A
College Student Writing across the Curriculum,” Lucille McCarthy describes the results
of a similar study that looks at a single student as he moves between his courses;
primarily, she is focused on how his writing developed as he transitioned between
freshmen English, biology, and poetry. In addition to conducting interviews and
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classroom observations, she also utilized think-aloud protocols, where he was asked to
produce a first draft of an essay for one of the three courses. Interestingly, he is also a
white male student who ends up studying a scientific discipline. Perhaps not
coincidentally, even though her data was collected almost two decades prior at a different
institution, her findings echo many of Beaufort's conclusions. As she argues, “although
the writing in the three classes were in many ways similar, [the student] interpreted them
as being totally different from each other and totally different from anything he had done
before” (243). She painstakingly documents his numerous difficulties. In his poetry class,
his critical essays were basically summaries, primarily because he discussed each stanza
in sequential order rather than use a thesis-driven structure. He utilized the same
approach when analyzing a peer-reviewed journal article for his biology course. In the
think-aloud protocols, the student seemed driven by the considerations of each individual
assignment, rarely reflecting back on previously learned practices. The learning process
seemed to “start over” each time he was faced with a new situation.
To help explain this phenomenon, McCarthy directly invokes spatial metaphors,
inviting her readers to imagine the student like “a stranger in strange lands” whose
“journey from one discipline to another” closely resembled the experience of “a
newcomer in a foreign country” (234). As she further elaborates in her conclusion, “the
courses for writing may be so different from one classroom to another, the ways of
speaking in them so diverse, the social meanings of writing and the interaction patterns so
different, that the courses may be for the student writer like so many foreign countries”
(260). Building on this analogy, she compares disciplinary practices to new languages,
claiming that her study “raises questions about how teachers can best help student
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‘strangers’ to become competent users of the new language in their academic territory”
(262). Once again, these metaphors are largely appealing because they compare
disciplines to contemporary nation-states, which are politically defined by rigid spatial
boundaries. She imagines students almost like courageous explorers who must “learn the
language” of the native population to survive. This conception offers little room for
resistance, mainly because students are viewed as needing to successfully “adapt” to each
new disciplinary context; otherwise, they will simply perish in the wilderness of
academia. Finally, even if we confine our investigation to a single classroom, her
argument fails to account for the fact that the “native language” of a discipline contains
several conflicting discursive practices. To a certain degree, the “stranger” metaphor is
useful because it moves beyond the notion of writing as an acultural practice. Potentially,
the metaphor could be reformulated by looking at postcolonial theories of nation-states,
which often acknowledge the fuzziness of both borders and linguistic practices. However,
in its current incarnation, the study treats contexts mostly as bounded locations.
When we imagine learning to write as essentially the process of adopting the
“native language” of a place’s residents, the problem is that struggle always seems to be a
sign of maladaptation. The idea is that a person’s previous linguistic practices are
somehow “interfering” with those of the new community. The implication is that we need
to work toward alleviating such conflicts, which is part of the reason that transfer
research is so focused on simply cataloging the challenges that students experience as
they transition between classes. To justify his reform proposals, Smit cites Walvoord and
McCarthy’s case studies of four different disciplinary courses, pointing out the numerous
examples “of students who try to apply knowledge and experience that is inappropriate or

53

in ways that are not helpful” (129). In Patrick Dias et al.’s examination of the transition
between university and workplace contexts, they argue that new workers often report
“feelings of disjuncture and anxiety quite different from those experienced in their
schooling” (196-7). They argue that these struggles ultimately stem from “the need to
learn new ways to learn [work] genres” (197). In Randall Popken’s theoretical discussion
of transfer issues, he distinguishes between “positive” and “negative” transfer, arguing
the latter category includes cases that “create discord: the properties of the familiar genre
do not match those of the unfamiliar” (6). Borrowing from the language of Mary Ann
Eiler, he characterizes such situations as “genre interference,” when “properties of one
genre are inappropriate or dysfunctional when used in another context” (6). Rather than
seeing these struggles as constructive attempts to draw on existing resources, these
researchers portray students as simply failing to successfully utilize their previously
learned skills. To put this in the language of commodification, students are viewed as
consumers who have purchased the wrong tool to solve a particular problem, almost like
a mechanic who brings a hacksaw to remove the tire from a vehicle. The idea is that only
one “tool” will fit the needs of the situation. As I have pointed out throughout this
section, the problem with this view is that any given community is actually composed of
people engaged in a variety of discursive practices. An adequate theoretical model must
take into account that social groups actually consist of numerous individuals who are
embedded in a network of fluctuating power relationships.
Final Thoughts
For a model to avoid representing practices as things, it needs to overcome three
obstacles. First, it needs to solve what I have described as the problem of overlap. Rather
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than viewing a textual practice as an object, it needs to be imagined as a flexible entity
with fuzzy boundaries. A satisfying model should allow for some ambiguity about how to
define particular practices. Second, it needs to dissolve the issue of location, which is
mainly a question of the verbs that we use to explain the learning process. Of course,
practices are not like items that can be purchased at a store; as such, if we describe them
as being “acquired” by students, we need to explain where they get these mystical
practice-objects. Alternatively, if we imagine them as being “internalized,” we are
viewing them almost like molecules that are absorbed through a cell membrane; once
again, the question naturally arises of where we might find these transcendent entities.
Finally, the metaphor must somehow resolve the issue of change. Clearly, experienced
writers are capable of utilizing their previously learned textual habits to accomplish tasks
in new contexts. However, if we imagine practices as unified objects, it seems almost
impossible to explain how a previously learned skill might be transformed by a writer to
solve a novel problem.
While our discipline has a rich theoretical conversation about how to understand
social context, many transfer studies have an unfortunate tendency to portray writing
classrooms and academic disciplines as homogenous places with clearly defined
boundaries. The most popular metaphor for understanding social groups is currently the
notion of a discourse community, which is defined by a common “language” that is
shared among members and gives meaning to their practices. While there is nothing
necessarily problematic with this concept, it frequently overemphasizes what causes
groups to cohere and remain stable. As a result, scholars sometimes neglect that social
groups are heterogeneous. While it is possible to a certain extent to talk about a “shared”
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discourse, we also must realize that community members come from a variety of different
backgrounds and are continually working to position themselves in more advantage ways.
A group’s boundaries are always open to renegotiation as people challenge existing social
practices in order to meet the needs of new situations. Communities are therefore
inherently historical entities that are inextricably caught in the flow of time. While
moving beyond the metaphor of discourse community might be helpful in overcoming
these difficulties, the important thing is to view groups as consisting of people embedded
in a set of conflicting relationships.
Due to this tendency to commodify textual practices, the “transfer problem” is
likely not as insurmountable as imagined by many researchers. Certainly, improvement
can always be made to the existing curriculum, but caution is always necessary when
making such sweeping reforms. In the next chapter, my focus will turn to the privilege
granted to our conscious actions in transfer research. This tendency can be seen in our
methodological approaches, which tend to problematically assume that self-reports about
learning are accurate reflections of the actual process. However, in most current expertise
research, scholars emphasize that conscious, rational decision-making is frequently the
strategy most commonly utilized by novices; in contrast, experts tend to rely on widerange of intuitive habits that allow them to immediately assess the situation. My
argument is that we need to acknowledge the importance of these unconscious behaviors.
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CHAPTER III
THE MYTH OF THE CONSCIOUS WRITER
The previous chapter examined the ways that transfer researchers represent
practices as commodities, which students acquire over the course of their education and
then sell to their employers. While scholars rarely explicitly advocate this position, it can
be seen primarily in their use of metaphors—in many cases, practices are represented as
physical things that learners “transfer” between different locations, almost like a truck
shipping a product to a department store. The problem with this perspective is that it fails
to capture several characteristics of social practices. In particular, it neglects the way that
they often overlap and share resources—while it might seem that writing a business
memo and a short story are distinct activities, they both at least draw on certain basic
syntactic skills, such as composing paragraphs and coherent sentences. Also, this model
provides a limited sense of how learners change over time. For example, if practices are
imagined as tools, then the only way for a student to learn is to acquire new ones. As a
result, we frequently ignore how practices are transformed as students encounter new
situations. Due to many of these theoretical preconceptions, researchers have come to see
transfer as an intractable problem, mainly because they are unable to see how the “tools”
acquired in a particular situation can be directly applied to the writing tasks in a different
cultural context.
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One of the reasons that these metaphors are so prevalent is that they reflect a
broader cultural ideology, one that also underpins how education is perceived by the
general public, including the students that serve as the foundation for many of our
studies. In much of the transfer research, participants continually demonstrate a tendency
to conceptualize practices as discrete entities. In some cases, they seem to view writing as
nothing more than memorizing rigid forms, such as the proper place to put a salutation on
a letter. In other cases, they dismiss English courses as only teaching them to write fluffy,
creative prose, which they view as being irrelevant to the factual writing in the
disciplines. Much like the genre and transfer researchers, our participants also neglect to
consider how practices are transformed as people move between contexts.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of taking into
consideration both conscious and unconscious cognitive processes when studying writing
practices. Even if students believe that they learned nothing but “fluffy prose” from firstyear composition, they likely have developed several other practices without their
conscious awareness. Therefore, if we limit our research to just retrospective accounts of
their educational experiences, we risk producing a limited picture of what they learned in
their writing courses. One way to overcome these difficulties is to use a wider range of
methodologies. Composition researchers tend to privilege interviews, think-aloud
protocols, and similar approaches, which predominately provide us with information
about how our participants consciously describe their practices. We need to supplement
this information with measures of the student’s actual composing behaviors, such as
student papers, revisions, classroom observations, and teacher comments. However,
while broadening the types of data that we collect is a good place to start, the more
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important issue is that we need to reconsider how we interpret what students say about
their experiences. When students fail to explicitly mention using a skill in particular
situation, we should not necessarily take this as a sign that they failed to “transfer” skills
from their previous courses—rather, they might no longer need to consciously attend to
certain practices, so they might be focusing on different a aspect of their task. We need to
situate student comments within a view of intelligence that takes into account the
relationship between unconscious and conscious processes.
The Duality of the Conscious-Unconscious
While intuition might seem like a characteristic primarily of sports and other
physical skills, most decision-making research suggests that it plays a central role in most
of the professions. In Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, Gary Klein
discusses the results of studies of numerous individuals, and he concludes that the
rational problem-solving strategies encouraged by many researchers are rarely practiced
by people in many workplace environments. Instead of charting out the available options
and logically assessing each possible choice, most professionals simply select what seems
like the first suitable solution to a particular problem. As he explains, his initial
assumption was that novices were the ones who “impulsively jumped at the first option
they could think of, whereas experts carefully deliberated about the merits of difference
courses of action” (21). He was surprised to discover that “it was the experts who could
generate a single course of action, while novices needed to compare different
approaches” (21). To provide a simple example, his research staff spent considerable time
interviewing nurses to discover how they were able to determine whether babies
contracted an infection. Astonishingly, many nurses can immediately discern whether a
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child needs to start an antibiotics regimen, even if tests from the hospital seem to indicate
that he/she was healthy (40). When researchers asked the nurses how they could make
such a rapid diagnosis, they were unable to explain the phenomenon; they responded that
they were simply acting based on their instincts.
Much of our existing transfer research doesn’t adequately take into account this
tacit dimension of practice. The issue is not with a particular methodology—although we
must recognize the limitations of certain approaches, the main difficulty is how we
conceptualize the unconscious and conscious aspects of practice. “Unconscious” and
“conscious” processes are not just separate trains moving along parallel tracks—rather,
they are deeply intertwined, to the point that any analysis is incomplete if it fails to take
into account their relationship. To use Etienne Wenger’s terminology from Communities
of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity, the two aspects of the mind should be seen
as forming a duality, which should not be confused with a dualism. The unconscious and
conscious are not opposites, nor are they elements located on different ends of a
spectrum, by which a behavior can be defined as more or less unconscious depending on
the percentage of it that is conscious. As Wenger explains, the tacit is not “that which is
not made explicit; the informal that which is not formalized; the unconscious that which
is not conscious” (66). They are not behaviors locked in competition but ever-present
aspects of the mind.
When we discuss the “unconscious,” we typically are referring to a set of habitual
processes that operate automatically without explicit awareness of the triggering cues
(Bargh and Morsella 74). These unconscious processes work together to create an overall
impression of our surrounding environment. Phenomenologists like to describe these
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fluctuating “impressions” as a person’s lifeworld, which philosopher Evan Thompson
defines as “the everyday world and the things that can be directly experienced within the
everyday world—our living bodies, our natural surroundings, our cultural creations” (34).
A lifeworld is different than brute physical reality, for it also includes all the
psychological resonances in which we imbue the environment. To give a simple example,
a door is nothing more than an arrangement of various molecules. But to a mind from a
certain cultural background, the door is an object which can be opened to reveal other
spaces. When we must confront a door, little deliberation is required to successfully use
it; in fact, it seems to invite a particular action. The same thing typically holds with many
linguistic behaviors. When we are caught in the flow of normal conversation, each word
seems to automatically beckon the next one, causing the sentences to just emerge from
the mind in a stream. While this process might be described as automatic, we should not
confuse it with being unintentional. Just like a soccer player moving down the field, the
speaker is guiding his words toward a fuzzy, undetermined goal. At times, these
automatic processes will break down. At these points, our conscious awareness will
redirect our attention, so we can modify our current behaviors.
However, this theory has no room for a particular conception of consciousness,
which imagines it almost like a disembodied mind capable of objectively analyzing
incoming sensory data. While we are capable of sliding their attention between different
cues, we not capable of completely detaching ourselves from the flow of activity. In
Cognition and Practice, Jean Lave demonstrates the numerous ways that the rational
model of decision-making fails to account for actual problem-solving processes, even
when people are engaged in seemingly mundane tasks like grocery shopping. As part of
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the Adult Math Project, her team of researchers observed twenty-five participants as they
engaged in a typical trip to the supermarket. In particular, Lave highlights what she
classifies as “best buy” problems, where shoppers need to make decision about which
product is the best bargain. As she discovered, most people seemed to discern a solution
upon discovering an appropriate frame for the problem. To give a simple example, one
shopper discovered an unusually expensive package of cheese. From what he could infer
from similar items, all the cheese packages were roughly the same size; however, the
prices for the other packages were considerably lower, which made the high price
somewhat unusual. He immediately surmised the price was a mistake. In order to verify
this hypothesis, he searched for a cheese package of the same weight and compared their
prices to search for a discrepancy (154). Rather than logically compare the prices through
a mathematical formula, the shopper started with the solution and went through the
process of making sure he was correct by using the available evidence. As Lave explains,
“he was relatively certain which cheese package was inconsistent with the rest before he
established whether there was really an inconsistency or not. The dialectical process in
the particular context of everyday arithmetic is one of gap closing between resolution
characteristics and information and procedural possibilities” (159). The shopper was not
engaged in a linear process, where he initiated a procedure to discern the right decision.
He instead recursively moved between the solution and the information provided by the
situation, continually adjusting his problem-solving strategies to negotiate between these
two poles.
In most of our daily practices, we only seem to initiate problem-solving processes
when we hit a snag—when an aspect of the situation defies our expectations. As Lave
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points out, “repeated interactions produce a relatively smooth ‘fit’ between activity and
setting, streamlining each in relation to the other, and generating expectations that the
activity will unfold unproblematically and effortlessly. In relation to this expectations
‘problems’ take on meaning as conflicting possibilities for activity, or troubles with
ongoing activity” (156). These “snags” bring what is an otherwise automatic process to
our conscious awareness. Then, we are able to shift our attention to other procedures to
resolve the difficulty. In the case of many writing situations, we might encounter such
snags when we instinctively feel that a sentence is inadequate. Afterwards, we will start
tinkering with it to resolve the difficulty. Alternatively, we might become stuck while
writing a particular text, so we turn to models to see how other writers have responded to
similar problems. Of course, we might also employ “rational” problem-solving practices,
such as analyzing a text’s audience, following certain rules, or constructing a linear
outline—however, these constitute only one set of options, and they will not exhaust the
possibilities.
If the “unconscious” is the set of habitual dispositions that work together to help
us understand our environment, then “consciousness” seems to be how we direct
attention to certain perceptual cues. When we hit a “snag” during an activity, we
automatically begin trying to resolve the conflict, and we start initiating problem-solving
procedures that we have developed throughout our previous experiences. In a similar
fashion, we also seem to have the ability to redirect our consciousness attention, so we
can deliberately focus on certain aspects of the environment that operate in the
background. As Glen Mazis argues in Humans, Animals, Machines: Blurring Boundaries,
one becomes “aware of the sense of what one is feeling . . . . but also is focused on the

63

cause of those feelings and is able to ‘move’ in guiding one’s attention here or there
within experience” (158). Citing an example from psychologist Daniel Siegel, Mazis
discusses a client who was feeling excessively agitated whenever she was feeling ignored
in a conversation. After discovering that these feelings emerged from her neglectful
mother, she was able to focus her attention to this aspect of her experience and
understand how her irritation emerged from her troubled family history. We are similarly
able to redirect our attention in more mundane daily activities. In the example of a soccer
player, he might note a bothersome opponent moving in his peripheral vision, and he
might choose to be especially wary of that particular person. In a classroom writing
situation, we might have been told by a teacher to make sure that we perform a specific
set of moves in our text, so we might make sure that we follow his/her directions. While
we are always immersed in the flow of experience, we also have the ability to modify our
behaviors through selectively choosing to focus on a specific aspect of the environment.
The Trouble with Retrospective Accounts
Without a vocabulary that highlights the interrelationship between conscious and
unconscious processes, we risk overlooking certain factors when measuring transfer
between contexts. In composition studies, the main problem is the lack of consideration
of the tacit dimension of practice when analyzing our research data. Due to the reliance
on think-aloud protocols and interviews, many studies focus exclusively on what is
happening on the level of conscious awareness. In the case of think-aloud protocols,
study participants usually discuss what they are explicitly considering during the
composing process, which is often related to the most unfamiliar aspect of the current
writing task. For that reason, they rarely discuss previously learned practices, mainly
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because such processes have been so well learned that they are deployed without any
conscious reflection. Interestingly, when subjects make this argument themselves,
researchers often dismiss the importance of their claims, even though students often
mention that they no longer need to think about certain skills because they just “come
naturally.” In the case of research that employs predominately interviews, many
researchers will neglect to see any “transfer” if the student is unable to remember specific
details from previous course. Researchers take this as a sign they might not have learned
the relevant skills. They also sometimes come close to conflating the participants’
opinions about classes with their actual value.
When we ask participants to discuss their previous experiences, we must take into
consideration that memories are not static objects that are simply brought into
consciousness through reflection. Rather, they are actively constructed by the participant,
who in the mere act of recalling an event can modify it according to the current
circumstances (Siegel 42). For example, even though a student might never receive a
single comment on mechanical issues in a writing course, he/she might recall his/her
teacher as focusing exclusively on grammar because of his/her ideology about English
courses. While such observations reveal a great deal about the perceptions of our
discipline, we should not take them as direct evidence of what “transferred” from
previous courses. Students probably are not fully aware of how their previous educational
experiences affected their current practices. Much of their learning occurred on the tacit
level and is not available for explicit recall.
To illustrate how such theoretical tendencies obscure what students have learned
from their previous courses, let me begin by returning to a study mentioned in the
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previous chapter, Lucille Parkinson McCarthy’s “A Stranger in Strange Lands: A College
Student Writing across the Curriculum.” While her methodology draws from a variety of
approaches, she relies heavily on think-aloud protocols, which were administered when
the student worked on the first drafts of his writing assignments. These were followed by
thirty minute retrospective interviews where he was asked about his decisions. In the
results, she found that the student focused on much different things as he moved between
the courses. In freshmen composition, his main concern in the protocols was with textual
coherence; in contrast, his poetry and science courses were more concerned with
disciplinary content. Her interpretation of this phenomenon is suggested by her title. In
her opinion, the data indicates he behaved like “a stranger in strange lands. In each new
class [he] believed that the writing he was doing was totally unlike anything he had done
before” (126). As she explains, he viewed the writing assignments in different courses
“as being totally different from each other . . . [his] characteristic approach across courses
was to focus so fully on the particular new ways of thinking and writing . . . that
commonalities with previous writing were obscured” (137). Certainly, in both the
protocols and interviews, the student often seems hopelessly lost when confronting a new
rhetorical task and incapable of drawing on his previous experience.
The problem is that her analysis does not fully account for what might be
happening outside of the student’s conscious awareness. Even when he suggests that he
might be instinctively drawing on previously learned skills, McCarthy’s discussion
largely ignores these claims. For example, when he struggles with his poetry analysis
essay, his explicit focus is with producing a “correct” interpretation of the assigned poem.
As such, the final draft mostly just summarizes the text, beginning with the first stanza
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and ending with the last one. When she asks him about whether he drew from his firstyear composition skills, he responds, “I didn’t really have to think much about my thesis
and subs because they just come naturally now . . . But anyway it’s not like in Comp like
last year. Here my first paragraph is the introduction with the thesis, and the stanzas are
the subpoints” (139). In her interpretation of this statement, she never addresses the fact
that he claims to be unconsciously building on previous skills. Instead, she argues that
“his focus on these new rules of use appeared to limit his ability to apply previously
learned skills, the thesis-subpoint analytical structure, and kept him working at the more
concrete summary level” (139). In fact, if the student never explicitly recalls using a skill,
she seems to assume it had little impact on his work. As she explains, the student
resembled “a beginning language user” (152). He might have learned to effectively write
in certain courses, but these skills did not “automatically transfer to new context with
differing problems and language and differing amounts of knowledge he controlled”
(152). My contention is that even though he never explicitly mentioned previous writing
practices, they likely functioned in the background, unconsciously operating as the
student focused on what he needed to learn to complete each new task.
Because McCarthy doesn’t account for the tacit dimension of social practice, her
study also sometimes misinterprets the student’s comments in his think-aloud protocols.
Once we take these issues into consideration, her student no longer seems like a
“beginning language user” who is continually leaving behind his old practices. Rather, he
is simply allowing his existing practices to slip into the background while he focuses his
conscious attention on the unfamiliar elements of the assignments. We should not be
surprised that in the think-aloud protocols, his primary concern in his poetry class was
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“interpreting the poem and properly using quotes,” while he concentrated more on
“accurately understand[ing] the scientific terms and concepts” when analyzing a
scientific journal article. We should anticipate this behavior from a student who hits
“snags” in the writing process. Much like the supermarket shoppers who initiated certain
strategies after stumbling into a discrepancy, the student was attempting to overcome the
new challenges he encountered in his courses. His previously learned practices had not
“vanished”; they simply were no longer the emphasis, for he needed to experiment with
different writing strategies.
Furthermore, we should not be skeptical of “transfer” from previous contexts just
because the student’s abilities seemed to “break down” as he struggled with new tasks. In
this student’s particular situation, he had considerable difficulty with his poetry course,
while he was much more successful with his biology assignments. However, this does not
necessarily suggest that his practices sometimes failed to adequately “transfer” in his
poetry courses. As Marilyn Cooper and Michael Holzman argued around the time of
McCarthy’s study, think-aloud protocols should not be viewed as accurate reflections of
our composing practices. As they explain, “direct evidence of cognitive processes is
unavailable.” Borrowing from one of Noam Chomsky’s analogies, they argue studying
writing practices is similar to “the impossibility of collecting direct evidence about the
nature of thermonuclear reactions that take place in the interior of the stars” (284). At
best, think-aloud protocols are demonstrations of what an individual was consciously
attending to during the writing process. Without any additional evidence, we are unable
to precisely determine the impact of the student’s previous learning experiences aside
from the fact that they made a contribution.
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While these issues are particularly evident in McCarthy’s work, the tendency to
dismiss the importance of the tacit dimension of practice is strikingly common among
transfer researchers. For instance, in “Knowledge Transfer Across Disciplines: Tracking
Rhetorical Strategies From a Technical Communication Classroom to an Engineering
Classroom,” Julie Dyke Ford examined whether students transferred skills between a
technical communications and engineering course. In addition to conducting interviews
and group think-aloud protocols, she also looked at papers and a reflective cover memo,
where students discussed the strategies used to complete their final research report. The
results indicated that while the students drew from the rhetorical knowledge from other
courses, they mostly relied on “model-based” writing strategies that conceptualized
genres as fixed forms. One of the students claimed that in their technical communications
course, he learned “how a memo should look, how instructions should look, and how a
report should look. So, [he] can get the spacing and the headers and all that stuff right,
but [he's] still not sure how my words flow together” (309). In contrast, the students
rarely mentioned abstract rhetorical concepts, such as audience, which many scholars
consider essential to the writing process. As Ford observes, “Rather than let awareness of
audience or sense of purpose be their guide to the other rhetorical strategies they relied
on, the interviews suggested that the students instead seemed to first think about the
concepts that were more tangible to them, model-based tactics” (310). Once again, the
assumption is that writers should let considerations of audience consciously guide their
actions; disapprovingly, she observes that “students did not reveal a tendency to plan and
develop their own goals, nor did they show signs of considering alternatives” (310). The
problem is that while the students might not have explicitly mentioned the notion of
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audience, a tacit feel for the engineering discipline likely operated in the background. In
fact, one student directly claimed, “it was a given from the beginning of the semester that
it was a technically oriented audience, so I didn’t have to think a whole lot about it”
(309).
One advantage of Ford’s approach is that she collected a large sample of student
texts, which can be used to determine whether her participants’ interview comments are
reflected in their finished products. They were evaluated by three doctoral students on a
four-point scale, with a “1” considered “competent” and a “4” seen as “clearly
incompetent” (307). Each text was examined by two readers, who rated its effectiveness
in six areas: audience awareness, sense of purpose, organization, use of visuals,
professional appearance, and style. Interestingly, despite the fact that the students rarely
explicitly discussed audience and purpose in the interviews, the independent raters
claimed they were competent in these categories. Overall, the students received a mean
score of 2.08 in regard to their “sense of purpose,” and only a slightly worse 2.10 in
respect to their “audience awareness.” If one were to evaluate the students’ expertise
based solely on these scores, they would seem to be mostly proficient writers. One of
their least competent areas was organization, where they received a mean score of 2.56.
Strikingly, this is the one area likely to be most impacted by their “model-based”
composing strategies. If the students explicitly claimed to deploy any single
organizational technique, it would be the process of determining the “parts” of a genre
and using this formula to shape the text. As one student claimed, “I had to write a report
like this in technical writing, so I’m going to look at how I set it up . . . where the page
numbers should go, stuff like that” (310). Alternatively, another student said that he
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would “go back and look at [his] technical writing book and see how [the report] should
be set up, what format to use” (310). These observations offer some support for one of
the key findings of contemporary expertise research—namely, that novices are the ones
who most frequently rely on conscious deliberation, while experts follow their intuitive
sense of what is needed in a given situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 30-35; Klein 21). The
students seemed to have a “felt sense” of the appropriate audience, which is reflected by
their high scores in this area. In contrast, their grasp of organization was on more shaky
ground, which might explain why they turned to rule-driven strategies.
A study that avoids some of these difficulties is Laura Wilder’s “’Get
Uncomfortable with Uncertainty’: A Study of the Conventional Values of Literary
Analysis in an Undergraduate Literature Course.” While her primary concern is not
necessarily writing transfer, what is unique about her approach is her desire to understand
the tacit practices at work in a particular classroom. She wanted to determine whether
literary professors expect their students to employ the writing practices that previous
researchers have noted are used by scholars in professional journals. To accomplish this
goal, she looked at whether a class invoked certain special topoi, an Aristotelian term that
denotes specific argumentative strategies used by a particular social group. She collected
a wide range of data to determine whether class members employed these techniques. She
observed class lectures and attended student conferences held by teaching assistants. To
get a better sense of the rhetorical strategies used by students in their actual texts, she
asked the TAs to select two successful essays, two “middle-of-the-road” ones, and two
poor ones. Then, she had independent raters determine whether the papers were utilizing
the special topoi. She also conducted interviews with the students that were identified as
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writing successful texts. Finally, she also distributed two questionnaires to all the
students, one which was intended to look at what students perceived as their purpose
when writing texts and another that attempted to determine whether students could
identify whether certain passages engaged in literary analysis. Overall, she determined
that the special topoi were frequently used in the classroom, both by the students in their
written work and by the professor when he was explaining certain concepts.
The strength of her approach is particularly evident when she analyzes the
professor’s lectures, primarily because his explicit statements often clash significantly
with his actual practices. At the beginning of the term, the teacher explicitly urges his
students to avoid looking for deeper meaning in the texts, to the extent that he directly
prohibits the use of many literary terms. At one point, he invites the class to analyze one
of Frost’s poems, and one of his students suggests that death is a prominent image. In
response, the teacher points out that death is not even a word in the poem. When the
student attempted to defend himself by picking out evidence to support his position, the
professor interjected, “If we keep going, we’ll underline every noun. We’re calling the
poet a liar; I know you said this, but you mean that” (186). He urges the students to “stay
close, accuracy, think in terms of description, [rather] than interpretation” (186). Then,
almost immediately afterwards, he engages in an extremely similar strategy. He informs
the students that “now we’ll make connections” and proceeds to interpret the poem’s
“pane of glass” metaphor as an Emersonian allusion. As Wilder points out, many of the
students felt tricked by this approach, and they even felt he was discounting their literary
expertise.
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At another point, when the teacher is discussing his assignments, he claims that
his instructions were “purposefully vague” because he wanted to encourage creativity
among his students. Nevertheless, he seemed to be looking for them to deploy some
specific rhetorical strategies. After they turn in their first assignment, he chides them for
“symbol hunting” rather than engaging in the complex kinds of interpretation that he has
been encouraging throughout the course. He even pushes students toward directly using
certain special topoi. At one point, he urges them to look for paradoxes, claiming that
“what one writer finds corrupt may be ideal in another work [is] the best kind of
argument . . . take [the] questions and make [them] more specific, more complex” (194).
In fact, throughout the course, he seems to have an overriding concern for complexity;
he’s continually demanding that students deepen their analysis of the texts. Obviously, if
Wilder had just directly interviewed the instructor, she would have only gained a limited
picture of his literacy practices. To get a better sense of what was happening on the tacit
level, she needed to examine his behaviors and compare them to his explicit observations.
To give another example of how triangulating between interviews and other data
richens our understanding of writing practices, Wilder frequently compares the students’
interview comments to the revisions that they made to their texts. Interestingly, she
discovered that while students frequently believe their writing changed little throughout
the term, they would slightly adjust their practices in response to the feedback that they
received on their early drafts. In one of the student’s essays, he argued that a poet was
using “sarcasm” to convey a message. The TA strongly discouraged the use of this term.
Instead of taking this approach, he highlighted a moment where the student employed the
word “mask”: “What you were arguing more effectively was that Bradstreet adopts a
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mask of humility in order to publish her poem but we realize through her words that it’s
only a mask to cover her frustration” (204). Even though the student had only
occasionally used the word “mask,” he proceeded to use it extensively in the final draft,
even though he admitted in the interview that he never felt this changed his overall
argument. At another point, a TA felt that one of the student’s papers was overly
simplistic, a judgment that was verified by the low complexity score given by the
independent raters. In the final draft, the student mostly retained his original argument.
Interestingly, though, he deleted all statements that suggested a simplistic interpretation,
including phrases like “it’s perfectly clear.” While this is not an enormous revision, it
indicates that the student understood that “complexity” was valued by his instructors.
Wilder continually documents moments where students make subtle behavioral shifts,
which often occurred without the students’ conscious awareness. I would argue that such
little changes—employing the use of a different word, cutting out particular phrases—are
what produce larger transformations. If Wilder had not deployed a methodological
approach that was sensitive to these shifts, she might not have ever detected these small
variations in their practices.
Wilder’s study highlights the central difficulty in educational research—namely,
the fact that practices change slowly over time, and learners are often not consciously
aware of these transformations. If most of us were asked when we learned to write a
coherent sentence, we would not be able to provide a specific answer. Most likely, we
would talk in a vague way about what we were taught in elementary school. While some
of us might be able to recall specific memories, most of our observations would just be
reflections of the dominant way of thinking about teaching writing to young children. To
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use an analogy, asking someone to pinpoint when they learned certain practices is similar
to getting them to reflect on changes in their personal appearance. If a person has gained
weight over the course of several years, they might have a general sense of how they got
to that point. They perhaps could indicate that they “ate too much,” but they would not
remember the precise meals, aside perhaps from particularly memorable moments during
vacations and special events. They also might not be aware of other contributing factors,
such as the life stress that comes from moving to a different location, raising young
children, or starting a new job. In fact, we are rarely aware of changes to our bodies until
someone points it out. In the same fashion, we are continually adjusting our practices to
meet the needs of new situations, often without the recognition that these slight
modifications are part of a larger transition. To design a study capable of detecting such
gradual shifts, we must do more than just conduct interviews or think-aloud protocols.
We also need to observe actual student behaviors, without which we risk missing details
that elude the people immersed in a particular practice.
The Interpretation of Retrospective Accounts
While acknowledging the importance of the unconscious dimension of practice is
a step in the right direction, the main challenge is developing a more adequate model of
how students’ explicit statements about the composing process influence their tacit
practices. Some connection obviously exists between these two dimensions. If a person
thinks “good” writing should be concise, this presumably should cause him/her to be
more diligent about cutting unnecessary words. But the relationship between the two is
not simple. From the existing transfer research, we know that students tend to have a
particular view of the writing process, one that acknowledges the importance of revising
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before submitting a final draft. On the other hand, we also know that students often fail to
follow this advice; many choose to complete the text the night before the due date, which
allows little time for revision (Bergmann and Zepernick 137). For many students, the
traditional model of the “writing process” operates like a set of moral commandments:
students believe they should produce multiple drafts, even if they continually violate this
principle. The point is that it is not entirely predictable how abstract beliefs influence
actual behaviors. When a student claims that he/she learned to “always revise before they
turn in an essay,” this is not evidence that certain practices “transferred” from his/her
previous writing courses. At best, we can argue that the student learned a certain
ideology, one likely taught in high school and then reinforced in college courses. To
understand how students’ practices are related to these explicit claims, they must be
viewed in the context of the other elements of their life, such as their disciplinary
interests, cultural background, and previous educational experiences.
These problems were originally noted by critics of early studies that draw heavily
on interview data. In “Talking about the Composing Process: The Limitations of
Retrospective Accounts,” Barbara Tomlinson argued that we are particularly accepting of
student reflections about their writing process. When we look at interviews of published
authors, we take for granted that they are engaged in a performance, one that often
reinforces our tacit beliefs about creativity. We are much less suspicious when we turn
our gaze to writers who are not professionals. We tend to neglect the ways they are also
engaged in a performance, one that reflects certain aspects of their life and how they
situate themselves in the university environment. Citing an assortment of psychological
research on retrospective accounts, Tomlinson points out that participants sometimes

76

report on cognitive processes “not by referring to memory, but to the most available ‘a
priori theories’ about what those processes might have been” (440). The issue is not that
memories are “distorted” by other considerations. Rather, whenever someone recalls an
event, it is always interpreted in light of his/her present circumstances. Therefore, what
we learn from retrospective account is not how student actually completed a task but
“their conceptions of how one should think and talk about writing processes” (442).
Looking back at the results of Ford’s study, what is interesting is the prevalence of
certain ideas about writing, some of which seem quite dismissive of the entire practice.
One student directly stated, “What is the point of taking technical writing when all you
are going to do is use templates afterwards?” (309). Many students sharply distinguished
between “writing” and “engineering” tasks, to the point of claiming that “in my technical
writing class we had to do an article review, but that experience won’t help me any here.
This assignment is a lot more concept-oriented” (306). One of the main reasons that
students continually mentioned “model-based” strategies is because they viewed writing
as dealing entirely with form. They mostly seemed to feel that writing was a matter of
mastering inane trivialities, such as the correct format for “the spacing and the headers”
and the necessity of initializing business memos (309). While these accounts provide
valuable information about how writing is perceived among engineering students, their
actual practices certainly extend beyond these limited confines.
Unfortunately, most transfer research rarely considers how such accounts are
influenced by cultural factors, such as peer groups, disciplinary ideologies, and previous
educational experiences. In “Disciplinarity and Transfer: Students’ Perceptions of
Learning to Write,” Linda Bergmann and Janet Zepernick discuss several focus groups
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conducted with upper-division undergraduates asking about their perceptions of first-year
composition. Their primary mission was to discover what skills “transferred out” from
the students’ previous courses. The results indicated that students perceived composition
classes as involving expressive writing, even though some the students likely took
courses with a focus on argumentation. Such writing was viewed as flowery and
excessively focused on correctness. In contrast, writing in disciplinary courses was
perceived as fact-oriented and less concerned with mechanics. While Bergmann and
Zepernick acknowledge this study merely measures the students' perceptions of the firstyear course, both the questions in their focus groups and their own analysis neglects to
consider other cultural factors that might have produced these interview responses,
mainly because they are not perceiving writing development as interacting with the other
elements of the students' lives. To offer one possible explanation for their data, it was
collected at a technical college, where the majority of these students were engineering
and science majors. Much like in Ford’s study, the students might have developed a low
opinion of what happens in English studies, which is often seen as intellectually suspect
in comparison to the rigorous hard sciences. While the students claimed their
composition course involved mostly mushy expressive writing, their comments might
just stem from being acculturated into a discourse that does not value work in the
humanities. I would argue that what is remarkable about Bergmann and Zepernick's study
is not the lack of transfer from first-year composition; without utilizing a methodology
that examines how students actually go about completing certain tasks, we have no way
of knowing how they draw from the tacit practices they have acquired throughout their
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lives. The more interesting finding is how little respect literary studies and composition is
granted by students from other disciplines.
One of the reasons that Bergmann and Zepernick never consider this possibility is
because of the privilege they grant to student comments. In fact, they explicitly open with
the premise that they “repeatedly observed a tendency among student to actively reject
the idea that what they learned about writing in high school or first-year composition
(FYC) course could be applied to the writing they were asked to do in the disciplines”
(124). Rather than being skeptical of such claims, they chose to “take these comments
from faculty and students seriously, as indicating that students may not be transferring to
their upper-level writing experiences the knowledge that we hoped they had acquired in
the earlier stages of the process” (125). However, they never fully explain why we should
take these student observations as evidence of what practices actually “transferred” from
their writing courses. Later, they even acknowledge that the students’ stories should not
be taken as “accurate representations of their actual process of literacy acquisition” (126).
They argue that they should be viewed as “representations of students’ own perceptions
of how and where they learned to write and, most of all, what students believe themselves
to be learning—what knowledge and skills they understood themselves to have acquired
as thinkers and writers” (126). Despite this confession of their study’s limitations, they
only briefly consider how a student’s other practices might encourage a particular
viewpoint on writing courses. At one point, they suggest that the students’ beliefs might
be attributed to the culture of the engineering discipline, “which tend[s] to have a
tradition of ‘toughness,’ passed along to both faculty and peers” (138). Nevertheless,
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Bergmann and Zepernick never fully investigate this possibility, partially because they
never inquired into such issues in their interviews.
A similar problem can be seen in Anne Beaufort’s College Writing and Beyond: A
New Framework for University Writing Instruction—except, in this case, she is
frequently critical of the student in her study, but only when he raises questions about the
pedagogy practiced by his disciplinary instructors. As I mentioned the previous chapter,
the study follows the work of a white male student as he moves between his first-year
composition, history, and engineering courses. Over the course of her research, she
collected a massive amount of data, including 20 hours of interviews, 30 hours of
classroom observations, and 100 pages of student text. When she examines the student’s
work in his first-year composition course, she is extremely dismissive of the classroom
pedagogy—to the extent that when the student’s observations conflict with the teacher’s
written feedback, she often assumes that he is the one with the correct interpretation. In
respect to an assignment where the student wrote a letter to a film director, she notes that
the teacher praised his work and wanted to include it in her classroom reader. In contrast,
the student described it as “some dumb thing,” which Beaufort interprets as indicating
that “it was not a piece of writing he took seriously in terms of his stated audience”
(37).When her attention shifts to his history courses, she is less prone to make such
judgments, even when the student’s comments are similar to those he made about his
writing course. She usually defers to the expertise of his disciplinary instructors. In the
interviews, the student described his work in an Islam course as “an exercise in
regurgitation. What we could tell we had learned or know” (67). Upon reviewing the
TA’s comments on one of his papers, the student claimed that “in order to get the grade
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on the paper . . . you had to say what you’d been told about the book. Maybe in a new
way, maybe in more depth, but basically say the same thing” (67). These observations
could be interpreted as providing more support for the idea that his writing was about
“doing school.” Instead of reaching this conclusion, Beaufort interprets the student as
making baseless complaints. Upon examining the student’s actual essays, she observes
that they demonstrate serious organizational problems, such as the lack of a focused
thesis statement. She even blames these issues on epistemological differences with his
first-year course, where “truth was something to quest after but with an open mind,
looking at many possibilities” (64). In contrast, his hard-nosed history professors sought
“greater certitude . . . to be credible, in the history classes Tim was taking, it appeared
one needed to make a clear-cut argument” (64). Of course, she never questions whether
encouraging this practice is desirable for a history student, nor does she look at the
student’s letter to the film director to see if it was “some dumb thing.” She seems more
interested in illustrating the pedagogical problems with the approach taken in his writing
course.
When we neglect to consider how various ideologies might influence the
comments of our research participants, we risk inadvertently reinforcing the values of
certain cultural practices. Because Bergmann and Zepernick’s study was conducted at an
engineering institution, the students seem to believe the English discipline has no
practical value. If we adjust our practices to these students’ views, we are encouraging
the values that underpin this discourse. Many seem to have embraced the idea that the
skills students learn in their university courses should somehow immediately translate
into capital that can be earned in the workplace. They imagine their writing practices as
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transferable commodities that can be directly sold to employers. Because this ideology is
hidden behind the veneer of empirical research, we are less likely to question it; we fail to
interpret the students’ comments in light of the broader cultural landscape. Then, when
we start to think about how to reform the curriculum, we are continually asking how we
can conform to their expectations, even when their views of writing are problematic. We
need to acknowledge that various ideologies shape the comments of our participants.
While it is important to have skepticism about our own pedagogical practices, it is
equally important to not just accept our participants’ views without fully considering their
implications.
The issue is that a practice is not capable of being fully captured by a linguistic
representation. When participants describe their behavior to a researcher, they must
translate their phenomenological experience into explicit terms. These descriptions will
be shot through with various cultural ideologies, which provide hints as to how
participants position themselves in relationship to other social practices. In most cases,
these descriptions will also serve a pedagogical function—much like teachers attempt to
find a way to describe unfamiliar practices to students, interview participants must try to
explain their perspective to outsiders with different experiences. While such information
is certainly useful, it does not necessarily provide direct evidence of a person’s
conflicting cognitive dispositions. As Bourdieu points out in Outline of a Theory of
Practice:
The relationship between informant and anthropologist is somewhat
analogous to a pedagogical relationship, in which the master must bring to
the state of explicitness, for the purpose of transmission, the unconscious
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schemes of his practice. Just as the teaching of tennis, the violin, chess,
dancing, or boxing breaks down into individual positions, steps, or moves,
practices which integrate all these artificially isolated elementary units of
behaviour into the unity of an organized activity, so the informant’s
discourse, in which he strives to give himself the appearances of symbolic
mastery of his practices, tends to draw attention to the most remarkable
“moves”; i.e., those most esteemed or apprehended. (18-19)
When participants reflect on their actions, they are being asked to discuss them in a
highly artificial research situation; as such, these descriptions can only provide indirect
evidence of the nature of their practices. They might be revealing which behaviors are
most respected by people in the larger community. Their comments might reflect how
they differentiate themselves from other cultural groups. They might also indicate their
immediate preoccupations, which will provide some insight into how they are
consciously orienting their actions. We need to take all these factors into consideration
when we are analyzing retrospective accounts of writing practices.
The point here is not to discount the value of interview-based methodologies.
Rather, the goal is to situate them within a more inclusive understanding of the
components of human intelligence. If we ask participants to explain their writing
decisions after completing a particular assignment, we are likely to hear primarily their
post-hoc rationalizations of their writing process. Due to the value our culture places on
conscious deliberation, they might be inclined to describe their choices as that of a
rational actor who logically chose between competing alternatives. Alternatively, some
participants might have learned to imagine writing as a romantic process, which might
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cause them to emphasize their moments of spontaneous, creative inspiration. While
neither of these descriptions provides a complete account of their actual linguistic
practices, they do provide some insight into the explicit ideologies held by many of our
students. To put this another way, these approaches are similar to reducing an animal’s
intelligence to its observable movements. Underneath the skin, an entire system of
muscle, bone, and tissue work together to help it make decisions based on specific
environmental cues. In the same fashion, we should avoid reducing writing to its most
easily measurable surface elements. Instead, we need a framework that takes into account
the rich tapestry of intellectual dispositions that operate in the background to produce
what we recognize as a competent linguistic performance.
Final Thoughts
The main problem with the existing studies is the assumption that verbal accounts
provide a direct window into tacit cognitive processes. Even when data is gathered from
multiple sources, the tendency is to not even consider evidence that conflicts with the
students’ explicit reports. However, once we look closer at these studies, we have
numerous reasons to believe that the information provided by students is not an accurate
description of what they learned from their courses. Many of their observations about
first-year composition suggest the widespread use of discredited pedagogical practices,
such as a focus on mechanical correctness and generic textual patterns. While it is
certainly true that some teachers focus exclusively on these concerns, it is unlikely that
such attitudes are as prevalent as indicated by the students. In addition, many respondents
also express that first-year composition deals mainly with expressive writing, which often
puzzles researchers who are intimately familiar with the curriculum at the research site;
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these claims arise even in programs that are explicitly focused on academic
argumentation. Finally, the students’ responses reveal evidence of many stereotypical
beliefs about the English discipline. Rather than view it as involving serious intellectual
work, many students consider it a field that develops obtuse rationales for what are
largely subjective aesthetic opinions. Just as teachers have no right to interfere with a
“personal” reading of a literary work, they should not expect a student to change their
“individual” writing style. Judgments about such issues are seen as a matter of taste.
Interestingly, while we are generally critical of such statements when made by people
from outside our field, we are less prone to question such opinions when expressed by
students.
We need to be especially cautious when students discuss the struggles they
experience in their courses. As I pointed out in the last chapter, the tendency among
transfer researchers has been to interpret any sign of conflict as an example of “negative
transfer.” If we view practices as commodities, this perspective makes sense—the main
reason a student would fail to learn a practice is because something has obstructed the
delivery, such as when a clog in internet bandwidth prevents someone from downloading
a file. The emphasis in transfer research on making connections between situations
causes any difference to be interpreted as a potential obstacle. Looking at the issue from
the perspective of contemporary practice theory, we see that student are not acquiring a
skill—instead, their practices are in constant development as they respond to other
practitioners. The next chapter outlines a model of practice that takes into account such
considerations.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RHETORIC OF ALIGNMENT
In “‘Mutt Genres’ and the Goal of FYC: Can We Help Students Write in the
Genres of the University?,” Elizabeth Wardle recounts the experience of a second-year
MA student teaching a learning community section of first-year composition that was
directly linked to a biology course. Instead of just using the assignments typical of
introductory writing courses, she wanted to design a curriculum that directly prepared
students for writing in the biology discipline. Most of her fellow teachers required student
to write summaries of research articles, but she thought it would be more useful for
students to produce abstracts due to their ubiquity in the hard sciences. She was also
skeptical about the value of teaching students to write standard argumentative essays. She
felt it was more important for students to learn how to construct “biological arguments.”
Given that she was unfamiliar with biological discourse, she began the process of
building such a curriculum by consulting with her colleague in the attached biology
course. As she explained, “I want to learn more about what knowledge is valued in [the
biology professor’s] field and how writing in the field of biology is supposed to be, what
their genre is like, because that’s what I would like to teach students” (779). Once she got
“all this discipline specific knowledge,” her goal was to “meld as much of into [her] class
as possible” in the hopes that students would be better prepared by directly engaging in
the writing practices of biological scholars.
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I want to describe this line of argumentation as the rhetoric of alignment. While
composition scholars rarely exhibit this reasoning in such an explicit form, it underpins
many of our debates, from the argument over explicit teaching to the proposals for
reforming first-year composition. This model likely originated in the industrial economy,
where workers must continually repeat the same tasks. Given that an industrial worker
rarely needs to adapt to new situations, job training mostly involves preparing novices to
engage in a narrow range of codified behaviors (Kalantzis and Cope 126). The goal
therefore becomes aligning the curriculum as much as possible with what is expected in
the target context. Applying this approach to writing instruction, the idea is that we
should require students to engage in tasks similar to what is expected in future contexts.
If we anticipate that students will write resumes, they should be given opportunities to
practice in this genre.
The problem is that this model of education only describes an extremely limited
range of practices. While our lives certainly involve continuously repeating a fair share of
codified behaviors, the truth is that the contemporary workplace frequently requires us to
adjust to new contexts. Unfortunately, many of our metaphors for learning remain mired
in this industrial mindset. As I argued in the first chapter, many genre scholars and
transfer researchers have a tendency to use metaphors that represent practices and
contexts as commodities, as unified things that students purchase in the educational
marketplace and then trade to employers for economic capital. When we view a practice
like a commodity, we see it as an object with a set of well-defined characteristics. The act
of teaching then becomes explaining these features to our students. Alternatively, when
we view a context as a commodity, we see it as a location with a fixed set of boundaries.
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Our goal then becomes helping students understand how to operate within these confines.
While this sort of reasoning is well-suited for preparing workers for industrial work, the
problem is that the situations that students face in the university are not such activities.
When a history student is asked to write in his/her courses, he/she does not necessarily
see each professor as engaged in a “discourse” with a shared language for talking about
the world. Rather, he/she sees an assortment of idiosyncratic professors, each with their
own set of expectations, which he/she must learn how to negotiate with to successfully
complete his/her degree. The truth is that most professional writing practices operate in
this fashion. They are not codified, repetitive behaviors but rather flexible strategies that
are built to respond to a variety of situations.
Returning to the example in the opening paragraph, the problem with the
instructor’s approach is not necessarily that she lacked the experience to adequately teach
students biological discourse. Of course, her class was certainly divorced from the act of
conducting scientific research. As Wardle points out, the students “could not write
[biological] arguments because the arguments depended entirely on research the students
were not able to do the first-year of in college—because they were not involved with the
activities of biology” (780). As the teacher explained, “they hadn’t done the kind of thing
that would merit writing in that way. What they had done was researched about
biological topics, mostly about genetically modified somethings” (780). But the
challenges run deeper than even this issue. Even if the teacher were capable of having
students conduct some research, she still could not adequately teach them to write like a
biologist. This discourse is not just a thing that can be handed to students. Rather, what
we describe as “biological writing” is the product of a collection of frequently conflicting
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dispositions. The student learns this practice by actually interacting with specific people
in the world. Rather than acquiring a “stabilized-for-now” genre, the student discovers
that the discourse is not stabilized and that his/her writing practices must continually
accommodate new situations.
Looking at the issue from this perspective, the rhetoric of alignment is somewhat
unproductive. When we are attempting to direct the curriculum toward a well-defined
objective, this way of thinking makes some sense—like a construction worker building
tracks to a specific destination, we can ultimately orient all our classes toward moving
students to a single unified point. However, once we begin to see a practice as not being
stabilized, this rhetoric starts to become problematic, for the destination is not a clearly
marked location but an ever-shifting target. The student is not just learning to do one kind
of biology. Rather, they are discovering several ways of doing biology as they move
between courses and become acquainted with new teachers. Becoming a proficient
biological writer means actually being acquainted with these differences. Furthermore,
steering students entirely into biological courses might also be problematic—after all,
understanding biological writing is not just about encountering the narrow range of
practices taught in biology courses. The student must also understand how biology differs
from other practices, such as those prevalent in the humanities disciplines. Learning to
write involves discovering how practices are embedded in a network of conflicting
relationships.
This chapter attempts to move beyond the view of practices as being stabilized,
unified entities. Rather, I argue that we need to look at practices as collections of loosely
related dispositions that are deployed through interactions with specific people in the
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surrounding environment. In the first section, I take a closer look at what I describe as the
doctrine of sameness, showing the ways that transfer theorists have privileged
recognitions of similarity in the learning process. In the next section, I claim that we need
to move toward a model of practice that views it as a temporal “coupling” between an
individual’s dispositions and his/her social environment. I focus particularly on the
importance of how people interpret their social world and sell their ideas to other people.
In the final section, I argue that social actors are best imagined as virtuous that are
continually in the process of modifying their practices to meet new demands.
The Doctrine of Sameness
The rhetoric of alignment encourages us to view learning as primarily consisting
of repeating behaviors across similar situations. In “Rocky Roads to Transfer: Rethinking
Mechanisms of a Neglected Phenomenon,” Gavriel Salomon and David N. Perkins offer
a typical formulation of this argument. As they explain, an adequate definition of transfer
must begin by distinguishing it from “mere” learning, which they define as an action
repeated in almost identical contexts: “When learning something leads to a later
performance we identify as more or less the same in a context we identify as more or less
the same, we do not call this transfer, we just call it learning” (115). As an example, they
utilize students memorizing dates for an exam. Their test performance would not be
considered “transfer,” even though some minor differences exist with the memorization
situation, such as the fact studying usually doesn’t take place at school. By describing the
process as “mere” learning, they convey the impression that it is ubiquitous—in their
view, most learning occurs through this process. Given that is the case, any difference
between the classroom and future contexts is a potential obstacle to a student’s education.
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Operating under this principle, many composition scholars have advocated using
“real world” assignments, with the idea that students will learn more effectively if
teachers minimize the difference between the classroom and professional environments.
The problem is that two situations are never identical, which means that we can always
specify an innumerable number of differences. To give just one example, classroom
writing is always evaluated by the teacher, while workplaces have more diverse
audiences. In addition, while the goal of many classrooms is the student’s learning, many
workplaces focus on achieving practical material objectives. As Joseph Petraglia has
argued, even when students are asked to respond to “real world” situations, they are at
best only “appearing to address an audience, looking like [they] have a purpose, and
pretending to be knowledgeable” (92). In the case of first-year composition, scholars
observe that disciplinary classrooms involve highly specialized discourses, which are
usually outside the knowledge of most writing instructors. As Wardle points out,
“everything we have learned as a field over the past decade suggests that specialized
writing is best taught by reflective insiders who know the genres and their content” (783).
While researchers mention other discrepancies, their main argument is that transfer is
difficult because of the lack of alignment with future contexts.
Similar assumptions underpin Wardle’s study of the prevalence of “mutt genres”
in first-year composition. Her data was collected from “learning community” writing
courses, which were linked with other classes in the students’ major. She conducted focus
groups, surveys, and interviews with both the students and the teachers; in addition, she
examined their first and last papers along with other written materials, such as a
rhetorical analysis and a cover letter where they discussed the assignment’s objectives.
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Finally, she looked at the assignment sheets from the courses. While the university
offered some broad guidelines, most of the curricular decisions remained in the hands of
the instructors. Despite this considerable amount of freedom, she discovered that the
teachers offered extremely similar assignments. She notes the prevalence of many
common genres, including personal narratives, profiles, interviews, travel narratives,
evaluations, reflections, and rhetorical analyses. In particular, she chooses to focus on
observation and argumentative essays, which she believes indicates some of the broader
problems that exist in many first-year composition courses. While these assignments are
intended as “practice” for future writing tasks, they often only share superficial
similarities with the work done in other disciplines. She describes such assignments as
“mutt genres,” which she defines as “genres that do not respond to rhetorical situations
requiring communication in order to accomplish a purpose that is meaningful to the
author” (777). For instance, the official description of the observation essays insists that
“paying attention to specific details is the basis of good descriptive writing” (774). Even
though “observation” is required in many disciplines, it often denotes very different
skills; in the natural sciences, “observation” means abiding by certain experimental
methodologies, while it might mean attending closely to the text in literature courses.
Once again, she considers these differences to be obstacles to the student’s education.
The problem is that we can always specify numerous differences and similarities
between any two contexts. According to Wardle, first-year students are in a unique
rhetorical situation, one that involves producing a text entirely for a teacher-evaluator
who will somehow rank their discursive performance. Other tasks presumably require
more complex audiences and serve more practical purposes. While some truth certainly
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exists to this claim, it neglects to consider how contexts are linked through numerous
similarities. When students move into future courses, they will continue to produce texts
for other teacher-evaluators. After graduation, most will move into businesses with bossevaluators, who might not utilize the same criteria but who will nonetheless be judging
their performance. Even if our students attain a management position, their work will
always be subjected to this ranking impulse, even if it involves little more than
comparing different incomes. As Bourdieu argues, social institutions are intimately linked
together through a set of homological relationships and therefore tend to reinforce similar
dispositions (Invitation 105-06). At the same time, social groups consist of members who
are continually shifting their allegiances and moving between institutions, so could also
specify numerous differences between any two contexts. Any sense of how “contexts”
operate must take into account the temporal nature of experience. A “context” must
necessarily refer not to a stable structure but rather to a network of social relationships
that is continually transformed as it moves through time.
Just as Wardle portrays contexts as unified structures, the mutt metaphor suggests
a similar understanding of writing practices. The term is most commonly applied to
animals, where it describes a combination of two different “pure” breeds. While the idea
of “pureness” might be useful when selling animals in the marketplace, no animal could
be characterized as being “pure” genes from a historical perspective. Throughout a
breed’s history, it has been continually transformed through its interaction with other
animals; its genes have always been “polluted” by other breeds. Genres similarly never
exist in a “pure” form. When we are talking about a “genre,” we are actually referring to
a loose label for a set of related writing practices. We could always point out an almost
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innumerable number of differences between two writing practices, even if they involve
people writing within the “same” genre. Due to the fact the world is in flux, practices will
always be somewhat different. One of the difficulties of transfer research is that some
arbitrariness will accompany any attempt to devise a metric for the sameness of two
contexts.
While some work has been done to resolve this issue, little has been accomplished
beyond the development of more flexible measures. For example, Salomon and Perkins
recommend looking at the distance between two situations. In one example, they describe
a situation where someone has learned how to drive a car and then finds themselves
behind a truck. We might classify this situation as “near” transfer because of the
numerous similarities. At most, the driver may have to adjust to the fact that the vehicle
requires more space to make certain maneuvers. As Salomon and Perkins emphasize, the
methods for teaching in such instances are relatively well understood, and many
educators intuitively utilize these practices in the classroom. Most of them involve
aligning the curriculum with what is expected in the target context. The more difficult
question is how to facilitate transfer between distant situations, such as going from
driving a car to flying an airplane. They suggest “bridging” activities, which help students
derive abstract principles that can be imported into new contexts—as an example, they
describe a teacher discussing the similarities between home plumbing and the human
circulatory system (Perkins and Salomon, “Science” 7-8). Regardless, the larger problem
is adequately defining “distance.” To a certain degree, transfer researchers have
recognized this difficulty, but how they deal with it merely highlights the limitations of
the traditional framework. In a moment of puzzlement, Salomon and Perkins confess that
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their definition of transfer contains a “suspicious circularity” (“Rocky Roads” 115).
Referring back to their distinction between transfer and “mere” learning, they point out
that no obvious metric exists to help us make a distinction between these processes; after
all, how people determine the distance between situations often depends on their
subjective opinions. Nevertheless, they neglect to consider what challenges such
difficulties pose for the concept, choosing instead to acknowledge that transfer is more
likely to be mentioned when something mysterious happens during the learning process
that was not anticipated by researchers.
Interestingly, claims of “unpredictability” are surprisingly common, particularly
in discussions of transfer between different situations. While David Smit acknowledges
that transfer is a regular occurrence, he claims that the problem is that people “do so at all
levels of abstraction, and we cannot say much about this phenomenon except that it
indeed occurs. That is, we know little about the mental processes involved and can
generalize very little from what we can observe” (132). In much the same fashion,
cognitive scientist Douglas Detterman goes so far to argue that “novel insights as cases of
transfer are probably rarer than volcanic eruptions and large earthquakes. Like any other
rare event, important cases of transfer are difficult to study because no one knows exactly
when or where they will occur” (2). He relegates true acts of transfer as the product of
occasional genius; in his mind, “very little human behavior is novel and of great
significance to the future of humanity” (4). Of course, this argument does little to clarify
how students approach “distant” situations. The hypothesis of many transfer theorists is
that people cope with new challenges by transferring skills learned in previous
circumstances. If the end result of this approach is that such transfer involves a
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mysterious process, then we have substituted a scientific explanation for some kind of
magic. The solution is not to abandon hope but rather to revise our framework.
A Model of Practice
Time is the main factor that confounds any attempt to develop an adequate metric
of sameness. Once we take into account that the world is always in motion, it becomes
impossible to determine in a rigorous way whether two situations are “similar enough” to
encourage transfer. As I mention in the introduction, Bourdieu has been criticized by
many theorists for being deterministic, but one advantage of his approach is that
temporality is placed at the heart of his model. Following the work of Omar Lizardo, I
see Bourdieu as stipulating a duality of structures. He views the habitus as a cognitive
structure, a conflicting set of dispositions that shifted in response to cues from the
environment. The habitus is in a dynamic relationship with the field, which he views as a
group of individuals embedded in a shifting set of power relationships. To better
understand this model, it might help to draw an analogy with what Salomon and Perkins
use as the paradigm example of a routine practice, which is driving a vehicle. If we view
driving through the lens of traditional transfer theory, we would argue that it is routine
because people are always repeating the same behaviors in similar situations. This way of
thinking captures a certain truth—when we step into a car, we always find the steering
wheel in the same place, and we always push on the accelerator to achieve momentum.
But the striking fact is the enormous number of differences that exist between driving
situations. As we move down the street, we encounter cars embedded in a set of shifting
relationships, and we must adjust our behaviors to their movements. On a regular basis,
we encounter entirely novel situations, such as when a person suddenly dashes across the
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street without waiting for the walk signal. Nevertheless, we are usually able to adapt to
these situations, for a practice provides more than just a set of habits—as Bourdieu
observed, it also allows us to improvise. If we use the driving example to understand
Bourdieu’s framework, we might describe a driver as the habitus, the individual’s
dispositions that allow him/her to adjust to the actions of other people. The other vehicles
might be characterized as the field, a group of people embedded in a set of changing
relationships.
Transfer theory helps enrich Bourdieu’s approach by bringing greater clarity to
the learning process. To address some of the difficulties in traditional transfer studies,
recent researchers have introduced actor-oriented theories, which argue that we must
begin by looking at how learners construct similarities between situations. While this
approach takes into consideration how the student changes over time, the problem is that
it frequently fails to take into account his/her relationship to the social environment. In
Joanne Lobato’s formulation of this argument, transfer is “the personal creation of
relations of similarity, or how ‘actors’ see situations as similar” (18). Slightly
complicating this idea, Ference Marton has argued that we must also consider how
learners perceive differences. These theories improve on the traditional framework by
acknowledging that similarities are individual constructions and not independent
properties of the world. Along the same lines, composition scholars have invoked a
variety of other metaphors that stress the importance of recognizing similarities. Drawing
from the work of activity theorists, Wardle has suggested that we should move away from
the notion of transfer and toward the idea of generalization. She argues that the concept
goes beyond just “carrying and applying knowledge across tasks” to include how
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individuals “construct associations among social organizations, associations that can be
continuous and constant or distinctive and contradictory” (68). This metaphor is more
powerful than the idea of just similarity, for a generalization requires the recognition of
both similarity and difference—when learners make a generalization, they are
recognizing a continuity between distinct situations, like when a person notes that the
wind blows before it rains. She also emphasizes that the student exists in a relationship
with his/her social environment, although her focus still seems to remain on the
individual.
In Agents of Integration: Understanding Transfer as a Rhetorical Act, Rebecca
Nowacek offers a more complex version of the actor-oriented theories, arguing that we
need to take into consideration not just the connections made by students but also how
they are received by other people. To support this claim, she examined a three-semester
sequence of interdisciplinary courses at a Catholic university, collecting data ranging
from class observations, interviews with professors and students, videotapes of class
periods, and copies of student essays. She discovered that although students were
continually making connections, they were not always recognized as legitimate by
instructors. As she explains, students must “learn not only to ‘see’ connections among
previously disparate contexts but also to ‘sell’ those connections, to render them
appropriate and convincing to their various audiences” (39). To highlight the numerous
ways that students can make connections, she offers a matrix of four different
possibilities, starting with the difference between transfer and integration. As she
observes, students sometimes consciously make connections, which she describes as an
act of integration. She limits the notion of transfer to situations where the connections are
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automatic. She also distinguishes between connections that are successful and frustrated.
Successful connections refer to those that have been effectively sold to the audience,
while frustrated connections are those that are not seen as valuable. Her most important
contribution is the idea that transfer involves not just observing similarities between
contexts but also using rhetorical strategies to “sell” those connections to an audience.
The weakness of this approach is the “connecting” and “selling” processes remain
separate. While she acknowledges that a learner must “sell” a practice, she does not have
a similar mechanism for how the learner notices the connection in the first place. These
processes are deeply intertwined—in the process of learning a practice, an individual not
only must attempt to convince the audience of his/her aptitude, he/she also must look to
his/her environment for feedback. To understand what I mean, it might help to introduce
what Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears describe as the difference between “transferring
out” and “transferring in.” When researchers look at what “transfers out,” they are
concerned with whether a student applies a skill learned in a particular context, such as
studies that examine if first-year writing students transfer their skills to future disciplinary
courses. In contrast, “transferring in” refers to how learners use their previous skills—
depending on how a person interprets the situation, he/she might draw not just from
previous college courses but also from other contexts. The idea of “transferring in” shifts
our focus away from applying skills toward how students make sense of their
surrounding environment.
The problem with focusing on “transferring out” is that it makes the scope of our
research too narrow. If we are only looking for a moment where students directly makes a
connection with a particular course, we might miss how they are continually drawing on
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the skills learned throughout their lives. Transfer studies are often inconclusive because
learners draw from a rich array of resources—a person might look to their previous
composition courses when beginning a new project, but he/she is equally capable of
turning to workplace experiences, parental advice, and peer activities. Looking for what
“transfer out” is like trying to locate a tiny thread in this tangled web of resources. Even
in the situation where researchers observe a student making a connection, the danger is
that noting what transferred will come at the expense of figuring out how it was
transferred. The entire point of transfer research is to elucidate the processes by which
students use skills learned in previous contexts. We risk rendering these broader learning
strategies invisible when we are mostly concerned with what students draw from a
particular situation.
To illustrate this point with an example from Nowacek’s work, she discusses one
case of “successful integration” where a student called upon a theory learned in a history
course to write a literary analysis of Doctor Faustus. As she explains, “this act of transfer
is best understood not as a matter of simple application; it is instead a more complex act
of transfer-as-reconstruction, one that provided not just a brick but the entire blueprint for
his argument” (44). Unfortunately, her analysis doesn’t go much further than simply
noting that the connection was crucial. Perhaps the reason the student made the
connection was because of the similarities between history and literature courses—after
all, knowledge is often shared across both disciplines, and they often deal with similar
texts. We might also argue that they have a similar relationship with truth. In both
disciplines, textual interpretation is a highly prized skill, and knowledge is rarely viewed
as a fixed commodity. Nevertheless, a number of differences likely existed between his
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history and literature courses, which might include significant things like the rhetorical
strategies expected by the instructors or minor things like the physical arrangement of the
desks. Of course, what complicates this picture even more is that our perception is
irrelevant. The student is the one that must make these observations. Given that is the
case, we might take into account a number of other issues, such as whether he had
successfully employed a similar strategy in previous literature courses. The point is that
while we can certainly say something transferred in this situation, we are left without
many clues as to how the student went about making the connection.
The difficulty partially stems from the metaphors that Nowacek uses to imagine
the transfer process. As she explains, the “integration” metaphor “provides a compact and
powerful way of understanding transfer as a rhetorical act, one that involves seeing and
selling” (35). While selling is definitely a complex rhetorical act, seeing is often
perceived as a more passive process. We rarely think that we have much control over our
vision, aside perhaps from the ability to bring one object into focus while allowing the
remaining elements to fade into the background. Following Schwartz et al., I want to
suggest that the concept of interpretation offers a better model for how students go about
making sense of the surrounding environment. Interpretation involves an act that is
attentive to not just what is in the foreground but also what is hidden from view. In
addition, while seeing is frequently imagined as an instinctual process, interpretation is
considered a learned behavior that varies among members of different social groups.
As a way of illustrating what they mean by interpretation, Schwartz et al. discuss
an unpublished experiment designed by Kay Burgess that examined what strategies
different leaners use to tackle problems outside their realm of experience. She confronted
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both fifth-graders and college students with the difficult problem of how to develop a
recovery plan for stimulating the growth of the bald eagle population in their state. The
students began the study with little knowledge of the subject. In the first segment of the
experiment, she directly asked how they would resolve the issue, and not surprisingly
both groups failed to devise a workable solution. In contrast, the second part of the study
attempted to discern what questions students would ask to obtain the information needed
to tackle the problem. Some significant differences existed between the two groups. The
fifth-graders mostly focused on specific characteristics of the eagles, such as their size,
eating habits, and habitats. In contrast, the college students generally looked at the
relationship between the eagle and their larger environment. The experiment was
repeated among school principals, except this time she asked the principles to describe
how they would learn to solve the problem. She discovered a similar phenomenon—once
again, they were unable to determine a workable solution, but they had a better
understanding of how to find an answer. They were much less confident about the
usefulness of their prior knowledge and more willing to abandon their initial
assumptions. They also considered issues that were mostly neglected by the students,
such as how to build support for eagle recovery efforts in the larger community.
A number of lessons can be learned from the experiment, the most important
being the enormous range of strategies that the study’s subjects employed to develop a
solution to the problem. A traditional study that looked entirely at what “transferred out”
from biology courses might be disappointed at how far off all the learners were from
actually developing a suitable recovery plan. However, when we look at what
“transferred in” from their previous experiences, we discover that each subsequent
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generation had more nuanced methods for approaching the problem. The principals drew
not just from their biology background but also from their professional experiences,
where building strong social networks is necessary for any kind of action. In addition, the
study demonstrates that learning a practice requires more than just developing a set of
skills that will then be applied to similar situation in future contexts. Rather, we must also
develop flexible methods of interpretation, so we are able to recognize our limitations
when faced with new problems and start working toward developing innovative
solutions.
Like many researchers, though, Schwartz et al. focus almost entirely on how the
individual responds to the environment, which neglects the role of social groups in the
transfer process. While people are continually experimenting with new approaches, no
guarantee exists that these innovations will be seen as valuable. They must also be able to
“sell” these practices to other practitioners. One way of imagining this process is through
the idea of “developmental coupling.” Drawing from phenomenology, King Beach
derives the term through an analogy with the theory of co-evolution, which is used to
describe the changing relationship between a species and its environment. As he explains,
“the coupling itself is the primary unit of study and concern rather than the individual or
the activity . . . the coupling assumes that individuals move across space, time, and
changing social activities, rather than being hermetically situated within an unchanging
context” (47). To put this into Bourdieu’s language, a practice refers not just to a set of
cognitive habits but rather to the “coupling” that binds together the habitus and the field
(see Figure 4.1). The most important part of Bourdieu’s framework is the central role
played by temporality. Rather than viewing students as moving between isolated
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contexts, they are depicted as on a trajectory through social space, whose motion is
represented by the diagram’s twisting arrows. A practice is not just a set of discrete
skills—such as the ability to write complete sentences—but also the capacity to
improvise these skills to meet the demands of the changing world.

Time

Interpreting
Field

Habitus
Selling

Figure 1. A Model of Practice
One of the reasons that Bourdieu was charged with determinism is that he never
brought much clarity to the processes that underpin the act of improvisation. While he
clearly felt that the field and habitus were undergoing continual transformation, he rarely
articulated what brought about these changes. One metaphor that he uses in a couple
instances is the idea of the hysteresis effect, a term that refers to the reversal of magnetic
poles and its resulting effects. He wanted to emphasize that the field can shift its
trajectory before the habitus has adjusted to accommodate the changes (Distinction 142;
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Invitation 130). The idea is that practitioners will continue to operate using their old
musty cognitive dispositions even though they no longer reflect the field’s current
structure. He argued that people paradoxically cling even more tenaciously to their
outdated practices even though they are in conflict with the social world. A contemporary
example might be American conservatives who have come to argue even more stridently
for the immorality of homosexual relationships. While we definitely can describe some
social changes as being the product of something like the hysteresis effect, the concept
seems to capture only a narrow range of situations. Even then, it primarily focuses on
how the field transforms the habitus, which seems to not provide much clarification to
how individual practitioners transform their social environment. The advantage of actororiented transfer theories is that they help clarify the improvisation process, especially the
role played by our interpretations of the social world and the strategies we use to sell our
practices. The twin arrows in the center of the diagram illustrate how interpreting and
selling help maintain the reciprocal relationship between the two structures.
The Virtuosity of Practice
The notion that improvisation is at the heart of practice brings into question many
of transfer theory’s assumptions. Many researchers are committed to the notion that
improvisation is a special event, which is partially why Salomon and Perkins distinguish
between “transfer” and “mere learning.” As they argue, “mere” learning happens when
the situations are so similar that the application of prior skills is automatic, while the
concept of transfer is generally reserved for moments where “learning has a side effect
we were not perfectly confident it would have” (116). One way they reinforce this
distinction is by arguing for the importance of conscious reflection. In their discussion of
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the distinction between the “low road” and “high road” transfer mechanisms, they
emphasize “low road” transfer is a mundane occurrence that happens in situations that are
so similar that the process is “quite painless and automatic” and requires little deliberate
effort (117-18). In contrast, “high road” transfer between extremely different situations
requires a more explicit act of formulating a mindful “abstraction in one situation that
allows making a connection to another” (118). They seem to view moments of significant
insight as being mostly the product of high road transfer, which is why they highlight the
Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press and Darwin’s discovery of evolution as an
example of this phenomenon.
The privileging of conscious reflection can also be seen in the recent calls for
first-year composition to focus on “rhetorical awareness” rather than teaching particular
academic genres. As Bergmann and Zepernick argue, focusing on rhetorical awareness
should “help students recognize that they are making choices, and how to make those
choices consciously” (142). Devitt’s argument for encouraging students to develop “genre
awareness" makes these claims even more explicit, to the extent that she states that
“conscious awareness of anything makes mindful living more possible that it would be
otherwise.” Her hope is that students can use their genre awareness to avoid “following
formula blindly because they will always be wondering about the contexts behind the
forms” (202). In a similar fashion, Beaufort argues that increasing “mindfulness” among
students is one of the main ways we can encourage the transfer of writing skills (152).
Much like Salomon and Perkins, these authors are committed to the distinction between
“blind” unconscious processes and “mindful” ones that are done with conscious
awareness. The idea is that people who rely on automatic processes are trapped within
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mindless formulas and are less capable of questioning the ideologies circulated by
various academic genres. As Nowacek argues, the problem with this position is that
“meta-awareness” doesn’t seem to be a necessary condition for transfer, particularly
given the number of students in her study that seem to make interesting connections
between disciplines without much conscious reflection. One of her students seemed quite
capable of intuiting “the differences in the goals of the various disciplines he was being
asked to negotiate” and was continually puzzled by his success (123). As she argued,
focusing so much on “metacognitive abilities is tantamount to pointing to a black box in
which a general cognitive ability magically operates” (17). Essentially, it is just serving
as another “general writing skill” that will supposedly help students in all their courses.
Bourdieu’s model makes no attempt to differentiate between “mindful” conscious
choices and “blind” automatic ones. For him, improvisation is how people cope with the
changing world, and it happens at all levels of awareness. Drawing an analogy with
someone playing a sport, he argues that a person engaging in a practice should be viewed
like someone who has a “feel for the game.” The player must attend to not just “what he
sees but to what he fore-sees . . . he passes the ball not to the spot where his team-mate is
but to the spot he will reach” (Logic 81). Much like a boxer, “each move triggers off a
counter-move, every stance of the body becomes a sign pregnant with a meaning that the
opponent has to grasp while it is still imminent” (Outline 11). Because we are caught up
in the flow of time, other people in our environment are continually responding to our
behaviors, adjusting their perspectives, and presenting us with new challenges. Our
ability to thrive therefore does not come from repeating the same old patterns. We must
also be capable of anticipating other people and choosing the best possible response.
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While conscious reflection is obviously one tool that we have at our disposal, our ability
to improvise is intrinsic to practice and often happens without our active awareness. In
Bourdieu’s view, a person can’t be said to have “learned” a practice until he/she figures
out how to improvise.
While Bourdieu grants improvisation a central role, he also emphasizes that
practices are bound in a number of ways, just not in the sense of a tacit “rule” that
prevents people from engaging in certain actions. The first way that practices are
constrained is by the brute fact of their temporality. At a certain point in an individual’s
history, he/she was taught their practices by other people, which caused the formation of
a set of dispositions that influence his/her future action. Bourdieu argues that the main
advantage of the concept of habitus is that it helps us move beyond the view that social
agents are either entirely determined by external causes or “isolated monads” completely
responsible for their own actions. They are the “product of history, of the history of the
whole social field and of the accumulated experience of a path within the specific
subfield” (Invitation 136). Everything from our parents to the experience of growing up
in a particular community influences our trajectory. But, while our past constrains our
practices in numerous respects, our future is also limited by other people, which is part of
the reason that a practice must always be viewed as a “coupling” between the individual
and the larger social environment. The field also has a history and is traveling upon its
own trajectory, and its members have developed their own strategies for dealing with the
world. As Turner observes, the reason people are able “to interact more or less
successfully with the ‘members of the community’ . . . is a matter of habit, a matter of
having successfully responded to feedback and having developed habits of response that
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enable, among other things, the person’s various purposes to be achieved” (75). The only
way for individuals to achieve their goals is to take into account the feedback of other
people. For that reason, we don’t need to resort to any mysterious transcendental entities
to explain the persistence of practices. The fact is that human beings are inherently social
creatures—we start interacting with others from the moment we are born, and their
influence provides the momentum that guides our subsequent movements through social
space.
But the most important part of his model is how it shifts our understanding of the
learning process. The problem with transfer theory is that it inevitably painted an
unflattering picture of students. We became extremely concerned with whether students
were “blinded” by their writing practices, to the extent that we questioned whether they
were even capable of bringing what they learned from freshmen composition into other
academic courses. Rather than introduce students to a wide range of practices with the
idea that it would broaden their horizons, we began focusing narrowly on just teaching
what we viewed as the particular set of routines they needed for the workplace. The most
important question was “what” transferred between courses, and we discovered much to
our dismay that it was very little—students were “strangers in strange lands” who seemed
to move between each course completely clueless about where to begin the writing
process. When we begin to look at things through Bourdieu’s lens, people no longer seem
like victims under the sway of the “rules” that they internalize from the social
environment. Virtuosity is not a quality unique to a certain group of people but rather a
quality that defines all practice:
Only a virtuoso with a perfect command of his ‘art of living’ can play on
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all the resources inherent in the ambiguities and uncertainties of behaviour
and situation in order to produce the actions appropriate to each case .. .
we are a long way, too, from norms and rules: doubtless there are slips,
mistakes, and moments of clumsiness to be observed here as elsewhere;
and also grammarians of decorum able to state (and elegantly, too) what it
is right to do and say, but never presuming to encompass in a catalogue of
recurrent situations and appropriate conduct, still less in a fatalistic model,
the “art” of the necessary improvisation which defines excellence (Outline
8).
Because people are always transferring skills to grapple with new challenges, the concern
here is no longer with what transferred between contexts. Rather, the question becomes
how the virtuous that enter our classrooms use their understanding of the social world to
improvise their writing practices.
Final Thoughts
Critics of first-year composition have often characterized it as an unusual course
that is designed to provide “general” academic writing skills rather than instruction in a
particular genre. Unfortunately, a vast gulf separates many academic disciplines, which
makes it difficult to see what “general” skills would apply to all these contexts. Even if
we wanted to align our courses directly with the genres that students will need in the
future, we have no way of accommodating the writing done in every academic discipline.
As I have been arguing, the problem with this claim is that it could be applied to all
learning situations. At first glance, a course like business writing might seem to have a
more definable content—however, after students leave college, they will move forward
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into a vast array of workplaces, each with their institutional cultures and their own
established set of procedures. The mere difference between school and the workplace will
require some kind of adjustment. In fact, students must continue to modify their practices
to the meet the needs of the changing workplace. When we are teaching a practice, we are
not just helping students “learn genres.” We are also introducing students to the process
of how to improvise their writing practices. In the final chapter, I look more closely at
strategies we can use to investigate how students go about navigating the “unexpected
situations” that they encounter as they move throughout the academic curriculum and
transition into the workplace.
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CHAPTER V
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The main problem with the existing transfer research is that it only explores a
limited range of phenomenon. In one of Salomon and Perkins’ paradigm examples of
transfer, they discuss a fictional individual who grows frustrated with his inability to
control his spending habits (“Rocky” 118). Looking back on his experiences, he
remembers a strategy that his mother taught him for dealing with his childhood temper
tantrums, where he was told to count to 10 in order to control his emotions. He applies
this strategy to his shopping habits and discovers it helps control his impulses. In their
description of his problem-solving process, they argue that he abstracted a principle from
his previous experience that helped him deal with the situation. The problem with the
explanation is that it focuses on the connection made by the shopper at the expense of
other factors. Ultimately, the fact that he made a connection is not that significant, mainly
because we’re continually transferring skills from our previous experiences. Part of what
it means to be a temporal being—an agent that operates within a fluctuating world—is
having to respond to new challenges, whether it be as simple as adjusting to a driver
drifting into our lane or as complex as writing in an unfamiliar genre. While it’s
necessary to note the connections being made by students, the more important
consideration is how the individual responds to the social environment, and, perhaps even
more importantly, how the social environment responds to the individual.
Rather than view “transfer” as some sort of special act, my argument throughout
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the dissertation has been that it is a fundamental part of practice. We must necessarily
draw on our previous experiences to tackle new challenges. However, even though we are
continually devising innovative solutions to problems, not every approach ultimately
helps us achieve our goals. Our mission as composition researchers should be to
understand the consequences of adopting certain strategies. Unfortunately, the problem is
complicated by the fact that we can’t assume that what students consciously report is an
accurate reflection of their practices. As Bourdieu argues, innovation occurs at all levels
of awareness, and some of our most profound insights might happen without our explicit
knowledge. In addition, while it is tempting to look primarily at individual students, we
can only fully assess the development of their writing skills by looking at their
relationship with other people. As I discuss in the previous chapter, a practice is precisely
the reciprocal relationship between a person’s habitus and his/her social environment.
Students are in the continual act of interpreting their surroundings and innovating their
practices in response, and, at the same time, they are engaged in the act of selling their
practices, which influences not only how other people perceive the individual but also
their world.
This final chapter discusses the implications of this perspective for future
composition research. While I don’t have any easy solutions to the methodological
problems outlined in the previous chapters, I suggest we should begin by investigating
how students interpret their writing assignments. The existing transfer research offers
some insight into what we might find, with many studies suggesting that students’ are
significantly influenced by their understanding of the politics of the university. Drawing
particularly from research into naturalistic decision-making processes, I recommend
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focusing on what students perceive as “unexpected” tasks, which are of interest because
they might provide a glimpse into what makes a student decide to improvise. However,
we should be wary about importing other methodological approaches into our field,
especially when it comes to how we go about interpreting interviews—rather than view
them as an accurate descriptions of a person’s actions, they should be seen as reflecting
students’ perceptions of their practices and what factors influence how they interpret the
environment.
Coping with the Unexpected
The reason we became interested in transfer is because it seems like an intuitive
way to explain how people deal with unusual problems. When people hit a snag during
their typical routines, it makes sense that they will “transfer” skills from other areas to
help deal with it. Of course, the problem is particularly acute for composition
professionals, mainly because we teach such a wide range of generalist courses. Students
that take introductory writing courses will be producing texts that seem much different
than what they will be asked to write in their majors. On some basic level, all disciplines
utilize similar writing skills, such as working with academic sources, developing
transitions between paragraphs, and producing compelling arguments. However, the
differences seem quite pronounced when we begin looking at the issue in more detail.
Even those of us who teach professional communication courses must sometimes wonder
whether teaching a business letter in a classroom setting is in any way similar to doing so
in the workplace. Ultimately, we can’t fully predict the situations that students will
encounter in the future, but we know that they will differ considerably from than the
assignments they complete in our courses. And, given the continual demand to justify our
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courses to administrators, we naturally have some anxiety about whether our pedagogy
has any use to students in other disciplines.
While our impulse to look at how students handle unexpected situation is the right
one, the problem is that we’ve mainly been looking for what students transfer rather than
how they go about deciding what to transfer between courses. Our approach has almost
been like looking at the raw materials used to build a sculpture rather than examine the
final creation. Obviously, when a sculptor has a vision about what they want to create,
they will utilize whatever they have available to make that vision a reality. The
interesting question is not so much the raw materials but rather how the person went
about deciding what to sculpt. The creation will ultimately transform the initial materials
into something new—indeed, when we’re talking about what it means to be an “expert,”
we typically mean someone who does more than just mechanically follow the same
patterns (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 30-36). They need to be able to move beyond the
limitations of their existing practices and respond dynamically to changes in the
surrounding environment.
As Schwartz et. al claim in “Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer,” the problem
is that educational researchers have privileged what they view as efficient practices,
which they define as those that allow people to “rapidly retrieve and accurately apply
appropriate knowledge and skills to solve a problem or understand an explanation” (28).
Their paradigm example of what they mean by efficiency is doctors who have become so
familiar with a medical procedure that they can almost immediately formulate a diagnosis
upon seeing a new patient (28). While each patient is to a certain degree different,
experienced doctors have encountered such a wide range of ailments that they are able to
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quickly determine which details are relevant and use them to make a decision. For that
reason, when we are looking for someone to solve a problem, the first question we
inevitably ask is how much experience people have in the area, largely because we know
the importance of being continually confronted with certain situations in the development
of expertise. While focusing on this dimension of practice is certainly important, the
problem is that the world is constantly in flux, which means people most frequently will
stumble into unexpected situations. It is certainly dangerous to have a surgeon who
doesn’t have enough practice with a procedure, but it is perhaps even more dangerous to
have one unable to recognize the limitations of a particular approach, especially when
he/she is in the middle of a dangerous operation.
For that reason, Schwartz et al. argue that we must also appreciate the role played
by innovation, which they characterize as the ability to “rearrange their environments or
their thinking to handle new types of problems or information” (30). One of the
advantages of their approach is that they recognize the importance of developing efficient
routines in stimulating innovation. After we have developed a set of procedures that we
can execute in a wide range of situations, we are more capable of having our intellectual
resources free to notice difficulties in the process. They argue that one essential
component of innovation is the recognition of our own limitations. They highlight a study
by Samuel S. Wineburg that presented both history experts and college students with a
set or unfamiliar history problems involving Abraham Lincoln. Interestingly, the history
experts were less likely to make questionable assumptions about the nineteenth century,
while the college students made flawed claims based on their contemporary
understandings (30). Schwartz et al. argue that what triggers innovation is frequently the
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recognition that the current procedures are failing and therefore a different approach
might be appropriate (32). Jean Lave makes a similar argument when she points out that
grocery store shoppers only initiate problem solving procedures when they hit a “snag” in
the flow of an activity (165-168).
The difficulty is how to go about studying such issues, mainly because the effect
our pedagogy has on helping students handle “snags” doesn’t always have an immediate
effect. If we teach students to write in a particular genre, we can immediately see its
impact when we ask them to produce something similar in a future assignment. We can
see how helping a student write a resume is useful when we hear back from students that
they used it to get a job. Teaching students how to improvise, on the other hand, doesn’t
produce easily measurable results. The problem is rendered more complex because the
most obvious method for examining decision-making processes—which is to simply ask
people how they go about handling problems—raises numerous concerns, especially in
regard to whether we are getting an accurate glimpse into an individual’s practices or
simply their post-hoc rationalizations. Research into memory shows that the mere act of
recalling an experience can actually change how a person remembers it (Siegel 42). And,
as Bourdieu argues, the simple fact that the practitioner must explain their decision to an
“outsider” means that they must assume a pedagogical stance when describing the
practice (Outline 19). Nevertheless, interviews play an important role in any examination
of decision-making process, so long as they are situated within a more comprehensive
understanding of practices.
In Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, Gary Klein discusses the
results of a series of studies that rely almost entirely on interviews, and his results

117

illustrate a number of facts about human behavior while also pointing to some of the
limitations of relying on introspection. His research began upon winning a military
contract to examine how firefighters make tough decisions. Klein entered the study
speculating that firefighters would operate under what he described as the “two-option
hypothesis”: essentially, they would have one option that seemed intuitively obvious, and
they would have an alternative that seemed to be a less attractive choice. He discovered
through his interviews that they didn’t even seem to be making what he considered
“decisions,” in they didn’t rationally consider multiple options and then select the best
choice. They reported immediately taking a course of action, and when the situation
changed and that option was no longer available, they seemed to automatically know how
to adjust their behaviors. In fact, it seemed to be novices who were the ones that needed
to carefully consider the advantages of several competing choices. In a dramatic example,
he discusses an instance where rural firefighters needed to contain an enormous blaze at a
farm of oil tankers. Due to their lack of experience with such large fires, they ended up
proceeding with a scattered mish-mash of different approaches, until they final decided to
stop trying to contain the fire and devote all their energies to thinking through their
options. Interestingly, their deliberations by themselves never produced a workable
solution—instead, they ended up calling in a team of experts from outside the fire
department who ended up using large amounts of foam to solve the problem (21-23).
His research focuses on what he describes as “naturalistic decision-making
settings,” by which he means studying how people make difficult choices during the
course of their actual lives. Rather than present people with a pre-defined task, he wants
to understand how they deal with messy problems, ones that involve time pressure, high
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stakes, unclear goals, and inadequate information. One of the important features of his
methodology is his concern with exceptional cases. Rather than concern himself with
abstract generalities about the workplace, he wanted his subjects to discuss their most
memorable experiences (12). As he explains, “By focusing on the nonroutine cases, we
were asking them about the most interesting ones—the ones they come back to the station
house and tell everybody about” (10). The researchers then searched through their stories
for “decision points,” which are moments where a choice was made in the face of other
reasonable alternatives. Afterwards, they constructed a timeline of the event based on the
interviews.
The most obvious problem is that he interprets the stories being told by the
practitioners as accurate representations of their experiences. While his team sometimes
“observes decision makers in action,” he admits that his research relies almost
exclusively on introspection (291). He confesses that he has no way of knowing “if the
things [his subjects] are telling us are true, or maybe just some ideas that they are making
up” (291). Of course, the question is not if people are “making things up” but rather how
we go about interpreting their memories. Looking at just the example of firefighters, they
might be influenced by popular representations of their job, where people go charging
heroically into blazes. The stories also likely have a rhetorical component, in that they are
intended not just to report the “truth” about an experience but also to sell people on a
particular image of their profession. What researchers discover through an interview is
not necessarily “what actually happened” but rather people’s perceptions of the event.
For the purposes of composition studies, though, one of our most important
considerations is how people are interpreting situations and selling their practices. Rather
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than see people’s stories as accurate representations of events, we need to view them as
illustrations of how people are mapping out their social environment and understanding
the relationships that hold between people. Furthermore, the reason to focus on
exceptional cases is not necessarily because they are the most “interesting” ones but
rather because they are the moments where people had to adjust their interpretation of
events. The reason people remember these experiences vividly is that they are often
accompanied by emotions, which psychologists argue are more likely to be classified as
“important” by the brain and therefore recalled more easily in the future (Siegel 47). As
Nowacek points out, transfer has an affective component—in the process of making
connections, students experience various emotions, often cycling between frustration and
elation (27). These emotions should be taken as indicators of the importance of an
experience. Even though we have frequently interpreted our students’ sense of frustration
as “negative transfer,” the fact is that frustration is a part of the learning process, and we
need to accept that student will be frustrated before they ultimately decide on what they
see as the right approach.
Unfortunately, the transfer research only offers a few glimpses into how students
deal with unfamiliar situations. In one example, Nowacek describes a case where a
student at a Catholic university was asked to write an essay on Thomas Aquinas. Many
students reported having difficulties with the assignment, mainly because the teacher was
asking them to do something new. He was asking students not to criticize Aquinas but to
articulate his theological project. As the teacher explained in the assignment prompt, he
wanted students to “recreate the way in which, according to Aquinas, human beings
achieve salvation . . . to make a case for the reasonableness of Aquinas’s theology on this
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issue. Be his defense lawyer” (112). While the task was confusing for many students, it is
nonetheless quite typical in the humanities, where it is important to understand the
complexities of certain foundational figures. Interestingly, though, the student didn’t see
the professor as just asking students to understand the ideas of a difficult theologian. As a
Quaker attending a Catholic institution, she was self-conscious about her own religious
identity, so she viewed the assignment as coercive. She interpreted the professor’s
demand to “get inside Aquinas’s mind” as a subtle attempt to instill Catholic beliefs in the
students.
Because she interpreted the assignment as an attempt at proselytization, she spent
a considerable amount of time figuring out a way she could circumvent the assignment to
discuss her own views. She wanted to contrast her Quaker beliefs with what she saw as
the dominant perspective of her Catholic institution. After some reflection, she decided to
make the choice of writing the essay as a dialogue between Aquinas and a “highly
deferential student” (57). While the approach was unorthodox, she sought to meet the
assignment requirements by “getting into the head” of Aquinas through his fictional
representation while still being able to challenge his theological positions. Once again,
the interesting part about this example is how incidental her “connections” were to
solving the problem. While she likely never would have considered writing a
philosophical dialogue if she had never encountered the genre in a previous philosophy
class, the driving force behind her approach was the perceived identity conflict. She
would have unquestionably tried to pull from other resources even if she had never
encountered the dialogue genre.
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The interesting question is what made the student feel that the instructor had a
religious rather than a disciplinary agenda. The other students didn’t seem to view him as
attempting to promote his Catholic beliefs. When the Quaker student suggested that the
instructor had a religious agenda in a focus group interview, the other students responded,
“I didn’t see it that way at all” (56). And, while other students struggled with the
assignment, they interpreted their task in a different fashion—another student who wrote
what the professor viewed as a successful paper paraphrased the assignment as asking
“what the guy’s project is” (119). The instructor himself portrayed the assignment as a
“critical exercise” that demanded the students contemplate the following questions:
“What ties [Aquinas’s] system together? What’s the most important thing about it?”
(112). Surprisingly, the Quaker student ultimately did well on the assignment even
though her interpretation seemed at odds with what the instructor presented in the
classroom. At least on a certain level, she managed to sell her understanding of Aquinas
even though she wrote in an unconventional genre, although hearing the professor’s
thoughts on the issue would have added more clarity to whether he thought she had
achieved the assignment’s objectives.
The previous example highlights the central role played by the student’s
understanding of the politics of the university in interpreting their writing assignments. In
this particular case, the student viewed the university’s Catholic mission as more
significant than other pedagogical concerns. Another question is how the student’s
perception of the instructor’s political affiliations—whether they are “liberal” or
“conservative”— influence how they interpret their assignments. However, perhaps even
more important is how students understand both the academic disciplines and the power
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relationships that hold between them. One of the student’s difficulties in completing the
Aquinas assignment is her lack of understanding of what it means to “do theology”—
rather than view analyzing Aquinas as an academic exercise, she interpreted it through
the more familiar framework of popular religious debates, where Aquinas is not only a
research interest but the foundation for a set of Catholic doctrines. In the same fashion,
our students come to the classroom with a set of perceptions of what it means to “do
English,” which are established not just by popular culture but also by high school
experiences. They may find it hard to dislodge certain views when they have spent years
completing grammar exercises, writing personal narratives, and reading literature. These
perceptions also might be reinforced by professors across the disciplines, who might find
it useful to contrast their own writing assignments with the “creative” exercises that they
imagine are happening in the English department. And, of course, English is a conflicted
discipline, to the extent that students might enter two introductory writing classes and
receive entirely different experiences. All these factors might make it difficult for
students to see how their English classes are relevant to their education.
The transfer research offers some insight into how the English department is
perceived by students. In Bergmann and Zepernick’s series of focus groups with students,
they discovered that they tended to associate English with “flowery” and “creative”
prose, which they saw as distinct from the more academic work done in other disciplines.
Of course, the fact that their university is considered the “science and engineering
campus of its statewide university system” might have impacted the results, perhaps
because students from the science have a more negative view of the English department
than those in other disciplines (143). On the other hand, even though the subjects in Lee

123

Ann Carroll’s Rehearsing New Roles: How College Students Develop as Writers come
from a variety of backgrounds, they expressed similar views. The longitudinal study
included both interviews and writing samples collected throughout the student’s college
education. One accounting student argued the essay topics in her introductory English
course were “random,” and she thought successful English essays required considerable
“fluff” (66). Another student was asked to read Cornel West’s Race Matters, and she
expressed frustration with having to “fight” the professor’s left-leaning agenda. At the
end of her education, she acknowledged that she learned something from the course, but
she expressed dismay at knowing that she would receive poor grades for disagreeing with
his perspective (68). These studies point to the need to have a better understanding of
how the English department is perceived across other disciplines. On a basic level, we
need a better sense of how students imagine the English department and how their
perceptions affect their performance. However, we also need to consider how their
perspective is influenced by other college professors and past educational experiences.
More importantly, we need more information about how different pedagogical
approaches prepare students for uncertainty. At the moment, we have only a few concrete
examples of students dealing with such situations, and they are scattered across a
disconnected set of studies on transfer and writing development. While we might
speculate that the politics of the university plays a significant role in how students
interpret assignments, the truth is that we don’t fully know how students handle what
they perceive as an “unusual” task. To be quite honest, we don’t even know what causes
them to interpret an assignment as being “unusual” or how capable they are at
recognizing their limitations. We also don’t know the role played by metacognition when
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students stumble across “snags”—while some scholars have argued that metacognition is
the key to helping students deal with unexpected situations, the research gives us some
reason to be skeptical (Nowacek 142). In many respects, “metacognition” is a concept
that brings us dangerously close to the “rational actor theories” that Bourdieu so bitterly
opposed throughout his work (Invitation 124). While simply interviewing students is a
good place to start such research, we ultimately need to go beyond such things to include
observations of their actual writing practices—perhaps by looking at how their
description of their processes match up with their changing drafts—and how their
professors end up viewing the quality of their finished products.
Conclusion
Much of the impetus behind recent transfer studies is that our knowledge about
how students develop as they move throughout the curriculum is woefully inadequate. In
“Teaching about Writing, Righting Misconceptions: (Re)Envisioning ‘First-Year
Composition as ‘Introduction to Writing Studies,’” Douglas Downs and Elizabeth Wardle
make a provocative claim about the current state of transfer research, arguing that many
introductory courses rely on the “deeply ingrained assumption with little empirical
verification” that writing practices transfer between different situations. When describing
the state of knowledge of our discipline, they rather bleakly state that we don’t know
“what genre and tasks will help students in the myriad writing situations they will later
find themselves. We do not know how writing in the major develops” (557) Without
more research, they believe teachers will be at a loss to figure out what to teach in
introductory courses, mainly because it will be impossible to tell if “choosing genre A or
genre B will be of service to students who must write genre B or genre C later on” (577).
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They argue that our ability to design effective courses will be crippled if we don’t
investigate these issues.
However, when we look at the actual literature, we find it provides us with
considerable insight into student writing practices. We encounter students raising critical
questions about what ideologies are promoted by the university. We see students utilizing
knowledge learned in a wide variety of contexts to solve difficult problems. We watch
students progress through their university education and slowly gain more rhetorical
sophistication. We watch them struggle with unfamiliar genres and employ a variety of
strategies to tackle them. Overall, we learn that even though students face a wide range of
different situations, they find a way to muddle through them, sometimes in spite of the
limitations of the pedagogy that they encounter in their previous courses.
One of my major concerns about “transfer theory” is that it causes us to overlook
these insights and instead ends up making students “look dumb.” If our focus is on
whether students draw on a particular genre learned in an introductory writing course, we
end up missing how they creatively draw on the totality of their experience. Effective
writers need to have competency in a set of particular genres, but they also need to be
able to address the particularities of the moment, which might seem to follow a familiar
pattern but also might deviate from it in significant ways. One of the main questions we
need answered is how students go about tackling these unexpected situations, and, even
more importantly, how to teach them to effectively respond to them. What we’ve learned
from the transfer research is that students will inevitably face situations we can’t
anticipate, whether it is in the workplace or in other courses, and part of what it means to
be rhetorically sophisticated is dealing with such difficulties. While this doesn’t suggest
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that we should just give up teaching students particular genres, we must acknowledge the
world is in flux—not only is it impossible to predict the conditions that might exist in the
workplace, we also can’t know how other factors, such as the development of new
technologies and communication techniques, will change what it means to “write” for
future generations. The one thing we can know for certain is that students will need to
deal with uncertainty.
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Graduate Student Administrator of the Writing Center, Middle Tennessee State
University, 2006-2007
Coordinated the Writing Fellows program, a WAC initiative that placed writing
center tutors into communications, physical science, music, and women's studies
classes; served as a mentor for new writing center tutors; conducted evaluations of
tutors; maintained and developed writing center resources, including handbooks,
workshops, and handouts.
Writing Assistant, Middle Tennessee State University, 2005-2006
Tutored students from diverse fields and backgrounds, ranging from graduate
students in health education to freshmen in expository writing; conducted and
designed workshops on MLA style, essay organization, and peer revision.
Writing Fellow, Middle Tennessee State University, 2005
Served as a writing assistant for Communication Studies 2020, Honors
Fundamentals of Communications; conducted one-on-one sessions with students
outside of class; offered written feedback on early drafts of speeches; facilitated
class discussion and in-class assignments.
Instructional Aide, ELL Department, Glendale High School, Glendale, AZ, 2003-2004
Tutored students from a variety of cultural backgrounds at all stages of English
literacy, including first generation speakers.
SELECTED GRADUATE COURSES
The University of Louisville
Research in the Composing Process (Joanna Wolfe)
Linguistic Theory and Its Applications (Joanna Wolfe)
Writing, Cognition, and Culture in Curriculum Design (Bruce Horner)
Writing Assessment and Response (Min-Zhan Lu)
Rhetorical and Textual Analysis (Min-Zhan Lu)
Nineteenth-Century American Poetry and Prose (Susan Ryan)
Teaching Composition (Bronwyn Williams)
Creative Writing (Paul Griner)
Introductory Applied Statistics (Namok Choi)
Cultural Rhetoric (Annette Powell)
Linguistic Theory (Karen Hadley)
Composition Theory (Karen Kopelson)
Middle Tennessee State University
Postcolonial Literature and Theory (Newtona Johnson)
Introduction to Literary Theory (Allen Hibbard)
Independent Study on WAC and Writing Fellows (Trixie Smith)
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Writing Center Theory (Trixie Smith)
Teaching Composition (Trixie Smith)
Composition Theory and Professional Development (Allison Smith)
ACADEMIC SERVICE
Facilitated pedagogy workshop, “Developing Skillful Writing Learners through Course
Document Analysis,” Spring 2010.
Member, English Graduate Organization, University of Louisville, 2008-Present
Mentor to first-year doctoral students, 2008
Facilitated pedagogy workshop, "Politics in the Classroom: Teaching the 2008 Election,"
Fall 2008.
Event Coordinator, Virginia Peck Composition Series. Guest Bronwyn T. Williams. “Life
Is Not Like the Movies (Or Is It?): Representations of Literacy in Popular Culture,”
“Popular Culture and Writing Pedagogy: Engaging What Students Bring to Class,” and
“Faces, Images, and Words: Identity and Writing in the Composition Classroom.” Middle
Tennessee State University. February 16, 2007.
Vice President, English Graduate Student Organization, Middle Tennessee State
University, 2006-2007.
Member, English Graduate Student Organization, Middle Tennessee State University,
2006-2008
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